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DEMOCRACY AND FEMINISM
Tracy E. Higgins*
Although feminist legal theory has had an important impact on most areas of legal
doctrine and theory over the last two decades, its contributionto the debate over constitutional interpretation has been comparatively small. In this Article, ProfessorHiggins
explores reasons for the limited dialogue between mainstream constitutional theory and
feminist theory concerning questions of democracy, constitutionalism, and judicial review. She argues that mainstream constitutional theory tends to take for granted the
capacity of the individual to make choices, leaving the social construction of those
choices largely unexamined. In contrast,feminist legal theory's emphasis on the importance of constraints on women's choices has led to a neglect of questions of citizenship
and sovereignty within a democratic system. By comparing mainstream constitutional
theory and feminist theory, Professor Higgins highlights the existing limitations of both.
She argues both that mainstream constitutional theory must take into account feminist
arguments concerning constraints on individual choice and that feminist theory must
take seriously the mainstream debate over democratic legitimacy. Integrating these distinct concerns, she suggests a framework for constitutional interpretationthat reflects a
feminist conception of citizenship under conditions of inequality.

[T]here remains something that seems right in the claim that women
have been operating at an unfair disadvantage in the political process,
though it's tricky pinning down just what gives rise to that intuition.
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust'
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B., Princeton University, 1986; J.D., Harvard Law School, i9go. An early draft of this article was presented at the
Georgetown Biennial Constitutional Law Discussion Group in December, igg5. I would like to
thank the members of that group, Bruce Ackerman, Jack Balkin, Mary Anne Case, Stephen Feldman, Martin Flaherty, Jim Fleming, Ned Foley, Abner Greene, Stephen Griffin, Larry Lessig,
Sandy Levinson, Linda McClain, Frank Michelman, Robert Nagel, Ruti Teitel, Mark Tushnet,
and Eugene Volokh, for their insights and suggestions. I would also like to thank Michelle Adams, Sherry Colb, Katherine Franke, Sally Goldfarb, James Kainen, Carlin Meyer, Russell Pearce,
and William Tfreanor for their comments and suggestions. I am especially indebted to Peter Yu
for his ideas, encouragement, and editorial skill and to Barbara Breinin for providing support and
distraction. I am grateful for the able research assistance provided by Stephanie Gold and Nicole
Tell. The research for this project was supported by a summer research grant from Fordham
University School of Law.
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(198o).
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do we mediate
and
spect for majoritarian will and the protection of individual autonomy?
This question, as many have observed,2 persists because we have a
dual loyalty: a democratic commitment to respect the political will of
the people and a liberal commitment to respect the rights of the individual. Though in conflict, these commitments are interdependent.
The individual must be protected in particular ways to enable him to
act within a democratic system as a citizen/sovereign. At the same
time, the exercise of popular sovereignty must be respected as an aspect of the freedom of the individuals that comprise the sovereign.
Thus, at the most general level, constitutional theory asks: How can
popular sovereignty be both constrained and unconstrained?
Despite the enormous amount of feminist legal scholarship that has
been produced over the last two decades, relatively little has addressed
these central questions of constitutional interpretation. For example,
little feminist work exists on theories of judicial review3 or methods of
constitutional interpretation 4 such as originalism, interpretivism, or
translation. In short, not only does feminism have no theory of the
state, as Catharine MacKinnon has observed,5 but it also lacks both a
theory of the Constitution and a well-defined theory of political legitimacy within the framework of democracy.
Feminists have not been uninterested in the Constitution and its
interpretation. On the contrary, feminists have written at length on
specific areas of constitutional doctrine, such as the First Amendment 6

2 See, e.g., id. at 7-8; Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 196-97 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988);
Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 2499-25oo (1988).
3 One important exception is Mary Becker's work. See Mary Becker, Conservative Free

Speech and the Uneasy Case for JudicialReview, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 975 (1993).
4 The scholarship of Robin West is an exception here. See Robin L. West, The Authoritarian
Impulse in ConstitutionalLaw, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 531, 534-39 (2988); Robin L. West, Constitutional Scepticism, 72 B.U. L. REv. 765, 780-92 (1992); Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REv. 642, 672-77 (xggo); Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty,
59 TENN. L. REV. 44I (2992); see also ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECON.
STRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1994) [hereinafter WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM] (collecting the above-cited works and elaborating an interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
5 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 157 (2989)
("Feminism has no theory of the state.").

6 See, e.g., Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex from the Pornographers:Cybersexual Possibilities,
83 GEO. LJ. 2969, 1979-94 (1995); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of
Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 587, 605-16 (1993); Susan H. Williams, Feminist Jurisprudence and Free Speech Theory, 68 TuL. L. REv. 2563 (994).
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and the Due Process 7 and Equal Protection 8 Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. But regarding theories of constitutional interpretation,
feminists have been uncharacteristically silent.9 When feminists have
considered constitutional interpretation, we have generally done so
critically rather than constructively. By this I do not mean to suggest
that the criticism has not been constructive. Rather, the approach
feminists generally have taken is to criticize the endeavor of constitutional interpretation and its results instead of offering affirmative feminist theories of constitutional interpretation. 10
Two related reasons, taken together, may account for the dearth of
feminist scholarship concerning theories of constitutional interpretation
and their role in resolving the tension between individual rights and
majoritarianism. First, the self presupposed by our constitutional
scheme" - either as a participant in the democratic process or as a
resistor to the encroachment of majoritarian will - does not match
the varied feminist descriptions of women's selves under conditions of
inequality. 12 Second, and consequently, the concept of majoritarian
7 See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights': A
Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CH. L. REV. 453, 509-14 (1992); Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected
Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 299 (1993).
8 See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex": Feminist Theory, Postmodernism,
and Justice, 8o CORNELL L. REV. 1536, 1542-54 (i995); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on
Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1z81, 1324-28 (iggi); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44
STAN. L. REV. 261, 347-80 (i992).

9 Or at least quiet. Some exceptions deserve mention, however. See WEST, PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 4, passim (arguing for a feminist reconceptualization of ordered
liberty); Becker, supra note 7, passim (criticizing the Bill of Rights from the perspective of women
and other outsiders); Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE LJ.447, 48o-507;
Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 987-1013 (x984);
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 543, 58o-g (1986). Nevertheless, relative to both the rest of feminist legal scholarship and
the rest of constitutional scholarship, the intersection of the two constitutes a surprisingly small
part of each.
10 Sometimes feminists purport to do both. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, "Freedom
fom Unreal Loyalties": On Fidelity in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1773,
1774-75 (1997) (questioning the legitimacy of the Constitution but purporting to "hold [it] to its
promise" through interpretation).
11 This self is largely the self described by liberalism - autonomous, individual, enjoying the
capacity to form both a sense of justice and a conception of the good. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITIcAL LIBERALISM 29-35 (1993). Of course, not all liberal theorists make the strong assumption of
individual agency or autonomy that many commentators attribute to them and that this Article
critiques. Indeed, the "liberal self" is something of a moving target in that liberals have responded
to critiques by communitarians and feminists and have qualified their conception of the self accordingly. See id. This Article is less concerned with the various incarnations of the liberal self
than with the particular conception that seems to underlie much mainstream constitutional
interpretation.
12 See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (theorizing observed differences in moral reasoning between men
and women); CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND

LAW 32-45 (1987) (rooting observed gender differences in women's oppression); see also DEBORAH
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will as both an expression of and threat to individual liberty - and
the related problem of structuring government in a liberal democracy
- serves as a poor framework for analyzing the range of threats to
women's liberty and equality under patriarchy. 13 As a result, feminist
legal theory and constitutional theory have developed with limited
14
cross-fertilization and sometimes at cross purposes.
This Article argues that mainstream constitutional theory's assumption of individual agency yields a distorted conception of women
as citizens. Feminist legal theory has revealed this distortion by exposing women's inequality, but it has failed to articulate a theory of political legitimacy. Responding to the limits of both mainstream and
feminist theories, this Article proposes a specifically feminist conception of democratic citizenship. Part I begins with a discussion of the
connection between individual rights and popular sovereignty as understood within mainstream constitutional theory and argues that,
having identified autonomy and equality as foundational in some sense
to legitimate democratic outcomes, much of mainstream constitutional
theory largely takes for granted the fulfillment of both of these conditions. In short, such theories rest on a particular conception of citizenship that lacks a critique of power beyond that exercised by the state.
To illustrate the implications of this limitation for constitutional doctrine, Part I closes with a discussion of the relationship between democracy and equality as conceptualized in the Supreme Court's recent
decision in United States v. Virginia (VMI).' 5 The Part concludes
that, because both the majority and dissenting opinions adopted a
view of citizens as free, self-defining individuals, both failed to address
fully the hierarchy of power at play in the case.
Part II considers feminist legal theorists' departure from mainstream formulations of central constitutional problems, particularly the
countermajoritarian dilemma. Beginning with an overview of feminist
constitutional critiques, Part T1 explores the ways in which feminism's
account of women's condition has informed those critiques. It acknowledges feminist theory's important contribution to constitutional
analysis, particularly in the context of equal protection. However, it
suggests that feminist theorists' inattention to the tension between funL.

RHODE, THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (1990) (presenting a range of
accounts of sexual difference and exploring their implications for law).
13 The term "patriarchy" as used here refers to the system of gender hierarchy of which law is
an important part. This Article discusses certain implications of this hierarchy but leaves to
others the debate over its origins and scope.
14 Feminist legal scholars have argued in other contexts that the liberal self does not correspond to women's experience. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory
and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 34-35 (I988) (applying this insight to tort law); Robin L. West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CI. L. REv. 1, 4-42 (1988) (comparing masculinist and feminist
assumptions about the self and exploring their implications for jurisprudence).
IS II6 S. Ct 2264 (1996).
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damental rights and popular sovereignty has resulted in a failure to
generate a feminist theory of democratic legitimacy. This failure, in
turn, has complicated feminists' task of distinguishing legitimate uses
of public power that enhance women's equality from illegitimate uses
that reinforce subordination.
Parts III and IV respond to this theoretical deficit by turning to
feminist thought outside the context of constitutional analysis. Part DI
discusses various contexts in which feminism has confronted questions
of its own political legitimacy in the face of conflicting political commitments among women, the group that feminism purports to represent. Drawing an analogy between feminist legal theory and
mainstream constitutional theory, Part III explores the various ways
that feminists account for dissent among women and within feminism.
The Part then explores theories of social construction and incomplete
agency as a means of explaining the divergence between feminism's
approach to its own countermajoritarian difficulty and the approach of
mainstream constitutional theory. Finally, Part IV applies feminist
theory developed in other contexts to the problem of constitutional democracy. It argues for a specifically feminist conception of freedom
and democratic citizenship premised on incomplete agency, and discusses their implications for the balance between popular sovereignty
and fundamental rights.
I.

DEMOCRACY, INDIVIDuAL WILL, AND THE STATE

Constitutionalism - the pre-commitment to certain core principles
or rights in a state otherwise governed by popular sovereignty - is
essentially antidemocratic in its impulse. The very purpose of a constitution is to remove certain possibilities from the ordinary range of
democratic governance, tying the hands of the People. 16 Enforcement
of constitutional principles by an unelected judiciary exacerbates the
tension between constitutionalism and democracy. 17 This tension has
been endlessly theorized and its parameters carefully explored within
16 Stephen Holmes explains:
[There is a] quarrel... between democrats who find constitutions a nuisance and constitutionalists who perceive democracy as a threat. Some theorists worry that democracy will
be paralyzed by constitutional straitjacketing. Others are apprehensive that the constitutional dyke will be breached by a democratic flood. Despite their differences, both sides
agree that there exists a deep, almost irreconcilable tension between constitutionalism and
democracy. Indeed, they come close to suggesting that "constitutional democracy" is a
marriage of opposites, an oxymoron.
Holmes, supra note z, at 197.

17 However, to the extent that the constitutional text operates to constrain legislatures, causing
them at times to ignore the dictates of the popular sovereign in favor of the constitution, the

countermajoritarian difficulty does not depend upon the enforcement of a constitution by an
unelected judiciary. See Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv.
893, 900 (199o).
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the legal academy for decades."' Defining and limiting the circumstances under which judicial usurpation of popular sovereignty is justified has been a central concern of the Supreme Court and
constitutional lawyers since Marbury v. Madison1 9 and shows no sign
of abating. Just last Term in VMI, in which the Court struck down
the male-only admissions policy of the Virginia Military Institute
(VMI), Justice Scalia in dissent expressed indignation over what he
saw as an example of such usurpation of the democratically-expressed
will of the People. 20 Thus, the debate continues and, perhaps appropriately, may never reach definitive resolution.
The purpose of this Article is not to enter this debate on its own
terms but rather to expose the way in which it has limited legal thinking about citizenship and democracy. 21 This Part sketches, in a necessarily brief and stylized manner, the tension between popular
sovereignty and constitutional protection of fundamental rights. It
then elaborates a conception of citizenship - of citizens as fully selfdetermining - that seems to underlie the mainstream debate. This
Part concludes with a discussion of the opinions of Justice Scalia and
Justice Ginsburg in VMI. It argues that, despite reaching opposite
conclusions regarding the constitutionality of VMI's male-only admissions policy, both opinions reflect liberal assumptions about citizenship
and individual capacity. Consequently, neither opinion offers an adequate account of the connection between VI's mission and Virginia's
failure to guarantee its women citizens equal protection of the laws.
A.

Agency and Constitutional Theory

In its classic formulation, the problem of democratic constitutionalism is to balance the threat of usurpation of popular sovereignty (itself
an aspect of individual freedom) against the need to safeguard the individual from majoritarian tyranny. 22 Invoking this tension, Professor
18 See, e.g.,

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS

BRANCH: THE SUPREME

COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-33, 128-33, 199-207, 233-43 (2d ed. 1962); HENRY STEELE
COAMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 78-83 (1943); Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 97 (1980).
19 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-8o (18o3).
20 See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2291-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Romer v. Evans, xx6 S. Ct.

620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for "imposing upon all Americans
the resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected,
pronouncing that 'animosity' toward homosexuality ... is evil").
21 This Article often uses the terms "popular sovereignty" and "democracy" interchangeably.
It should be acknowledged, however, that they are not necessarily the same; popular sovereignty
can be understood as one account of democratic governance. Thus, this Article uses the term
"democracy" in the narrower sense of majoritarian rule.
22 See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 18, at 16-19; see also William E. Nelson, Changing Conceptions of JudicialReview: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, x79o-186o, 120 U.
PA. L. REv. 1166, 1170-72 (1972) (offering an account of early nineteenth-century conceptions of
judicial review as a majoritarian constraint on elected representatives).
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Frank Michelman describes American constitutionalism as "rest[ing]
on two premises regarding political freedom: first, that the American
people are politically free insomuch as they are governed by themselves collectively, and, second, that the American people are politi23
cally free insomuch as they are governed by laws and not men."
Much of constitutional theory has endeavored to work out the tension
between these two premises. In short, the debate stems from a particular commitment to both democracy and constitutionalism and from
the resulting challenge of reconciling countermajoritarian judicial deci24
sionmaking with that normative commitment.
Constitutional constraints on popular sovereignty create varying
degrees of angst for constitutional theorists, depending upon the role
they assign to that sovereignty in establishing the legitimacy of governmental action. For some, the constitution's own legitimacy derives
from its status as the product of a democratic process. 25 For others,
the legitimacy of majoritarian rule depends upon constitutional limits
26
protecting individuals from the reach of the democratic process.
Those who root the legitimacy of the constitutional order in popular
sovereignty -

the democrats -

worry intensely about the threat

posed by constraints on popular will, particularly when an unelected
judiciary enforces those constraints. Yet, even the most ardent demo-

23 Michelman, supra note
24 Robert Bork explains:

2,

at

1499-1500

(citations omitted).

The United States was founded as a Madisonian system, which means that it contains two
opposing principles that must be continually reconciled. The first principal is self-government, which means that in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to rule, if they wish,
simply because they are majorities. The second is that there are nonetheless some things
majorities must not do to minorities, some areas of life in which the individual must be
free of majority rule .... The freedom of the majority to govern and the freedom of the
individual not to be governed remain forever in tension.
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 139
(I99o).
2S Examples of such theorists range from Henry Monaghan, Robert Bork, and justice Scalia,
who trace authority to the framers, to Akhil Amar, emphasizing the overriding importance of
political majorities, to Ely, Michelman, and Cass Sunstein, each of whom posits an increasingly
"thick" view of the preconditions necessary for legitimate democratic governance, but who nevertheless premise constitutional authority on the will of majorities. See BORK, supra note 24, at
143-46; ELY, supra note I, at 73-104; CASS R. SuNsTErN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 123-61
(1993); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment Outside Article V, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 457, 461-75 (1994); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, z985
Term -

Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,

o HARV. L. REV. 4,

24-27

(1986); Henry P.

Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 375-76, 395 (ig8x); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CiN. L. REV. 849, 854-56 (1989); see also Abner S. Greene,
The Irreducible Constitution, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 293, 298-3oo (x996) (characterizing
the tension between democrats and rights-foundationalists as reflecting an irreducible tension in
our constitutional structure).
26 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE 190-92 (1986); James E. Fleming, Securing
Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. I, 19-20 (I995); Sager, supra note 17, at 959-61.
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crat is unwilling to relinquish constitutional constraints altogether, 27

for the security of certain rights (those foundational to democratic participation) is necessary to the proper functioning of democracy.28
Rights-oriented theorists, on the other hand, view the constraints
on popular sovereignty as securing, rather than undermining, the legitimacy of state power. For such theorists, the preservation of fundamental liberties animates and legitimates our constitutional order.
However, even for rights-based theorists, constitutional constraints are
not unproblematic. 29 Because meaningful political participation is itself an important component of individual liberty, 30 judicial override
of majoritarian will can be understood as compromising the individual
liberty of those engaged in collective self-governance. In certain contexts, then, judicial review is simply the lesser of two evils.
Despite these different orientations, both rights-based and democracy-based theorists rely, at least implicitly, on the political efficacy of
individuals as citizens. This political efficacy, in turn, depends upon
the individual's ability to define her preferences free from politically
relevant constraints. This assumption of agency - of citizens' freedom and ability to define their own ends - is therefore essential to all
mainstream constitutional theory. 3 1 For rights foundationalists, the
self-determining individual stands at the core of liberal commitments
to neutrality. The constitutional framework preserves his autonomy
against the will of the majority, and his freedom to act on his own
vision of the good defines liberal constitutionalism's central value. For
democrats, the capacity of individuals to reflect on their own interests
and on the public good, and then to act in concert to govern them27 Indeed, none is willing to relinquish judicial enforcement of those constraints. See Steven
L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 69 TEX. L. REv. x88x,
1924 (iggi) (describing the suggestion that "U]udicial review is undemocratic" as "unthinkable"
(internal quotation marks in first quotation omitted)). But see Becker, supra note 3, at 986-ioi8,
1047-50 (arguing against binding judicial review for gender-based classifications). For further dis-

cussion of Becker's position, see infra p. x68o.
28 Among those listed above in note 25, Michelman and Sunstein find a very broad range of
rights foundational to well-functioning democracy. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 133-45,
x62-94; Michelman, supra note 25, at 17-55.
29 The near universal condemnation of the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (i9o5), demonstrates this point. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 873 (1987) (characterizing Lochner as a "spectre" that "has loomed over

most important constitutional decisions").
30 See, e.g., James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEX. L. REV.
211, 253, 288-97 (1993) (discussing the importance of both deliberative democracy and deliberative autonomy as components of liberty in our constitutional structure).
31 The use of the term agency, instead of the more common autonomy, is intended to denote
not simply freedom from external constraints, but an internal capacity to develop and act on
conceptions of oneself that are not defined by oppressive notions of gender. Moreover, autonomy,
as specifically used in liberal theory and in constitutional theory influenced by liberalism, may
carry meanings not intended here. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 26, at 36-39 (deriving a right to
"deliberative autonomy" defined primarily as independence from state-imposed constraints).
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selves, provides the foundation for legitimate state action. The political participation of free and equal citizens signifies continuing consent
to the power of majorities - consent upon which state power depends. 32 Thus, the role of individual agency is different for democrats
than for rights-foundationalists but is no less essential; it is conceived
as a component of the democratic process rather than as a constraint
on that process.
Despite the centrality of agency to conceptions of citizenship in
constitutional theory, the conventional framework for analysis tends to
underestimate or ignore two types of power that undermine that
agency. First, by focusing on state action, mainstream constitutional
analysis places too little emphasis on inequalities created by private
power and their impact on democratic governance. 33 Second, this
analysis largely fails to take seriously the claim that individuals are
socially constructed. That is, social conditions not only limit the ability of individuals to act upon their own vision of the good but also
34
define the very content of that vision.
This inattention to social construction does not mean that constitutional theorists are naive in their understanding of power or in their
theoretical conceptions of the self. On the contrary, most mainstream
theorists acknowledge the significance of social inequality beyond that
created by state action. 35 Many such theorists also acknowledge that
individuals are socially situated. 36 Nevertheless, the domination of the
32 The fiction of consent permits the reconciliation of freedom and constraint in a democracy.
As Benjamin Barber explains, "[by consenting to the substantive rules to which he will
subordinate his will, the liberal individual obeys without compromising his freedom." Benjamin
R. Barber, Liberal Democracy and the Costs of Consent, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE
57 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989). But see CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN:
DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 71, 71-72 (z989) (calling into question the validity of consent theory under conditions of inequality).
33 For example, many view arguments for a right to economic security and a minimum level
of education as unsupportable within our existing constitutional scheme. See, e.g., RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 36 (1996)
(stating that, although economic justice might require significant redistribution, the United States
Constitution does not). Theorists who consider such rights implicit in the Constitution often deem
them unenforceable by courts. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 138-39 (citing freedom from
desperate conditions as constitutionally required but not judicially enforceable).
34 Nancy Hirschmann offers this definition of social construction:
[Social construction is] the idea that human beings and their world are in no sense given or
natural but the product of historical configurations or relationships. The desires and preferences we have, our beliefs and values, our way of defining the world are all shaped by
the particular constellation of personal and institutional social relationships that constitute
our individual and collective histories.
Nancy J. Hirschmann, Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom, 24 POL. THEORY 46, 51 (1996).
3S See, e.g., DWOREiN, supra note 33, at 36 (noting that economic justice would require substantial redistribution); SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 138 (acknowledging the importance of freedom from desperate conditions).
36 Michelman and Sunstein offer the most subtle arguments with respect to socially defined
constraints. Michelman acknowledges the degree to which individuals are socially situated and
defined by community. Nevertheless, he does not generally explore the intersection of that situat-
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mainstream debate by the democratic will/fundamental rights framework has tended to relegate these considerations to the background.
Thus, among democrats, even those theorists who have taken the
broadest view of the preconditions for political participation have
largely limited their attention to external constraints on meaningful
political participation. This reluctance to engage questions of internal
constraints is understandable. Questioning the individual's formation
of preferences, rather than simply her ability to effectuate them politically, undermines a commitment to popular sovereignty as the primary
legitimating principle of government action. Under such analysis,
political outcomes can no longer be justified simply by collective
choice in their favor, but must be measured against some conception
of appropriate substantive constraints on that choice.
Although incorporating internal constraints renders popular sovereignty problematic, it does not justify a shift to a rights-based analysis.
Rights foundationalists have paid even less attention to internal constraints than have democrats. Instead, they often define the formation
of individual preferences - the individual's own conception of the
good - as the core of autonomy and privacy that must be safeguarded.37 The very logic of rights-based theories inspired by liberalism seems to preclude - or render irrelevant - a more complex
conception of the self.
In sum, most mainstream constitutional theory simply posits a
"clear line between inner and outer, self and other, subject and object:
desires come from within, restraints, from without; desires are formed
by subjects, by selves, they are thwarted by objects, by others."38 This
inattention to internal constraints on identity and preference formation
permits democrats to justify state action as the legitimate expression of
popular will. It allows rights foundationalists to justify limitations on
the reach of the state as a means of defending the domain of the self.
Nevertheless, whether expressed as the confidence of democrats in the
political process or the focus of rights foundationalists on the threat of
state power, this assumption of individual agency oversimplifies the
relationships between citizenship and democracy by ignoring the interdependence of identity and public power.

edness and systemic power differences. Moreover, his reconciliation of freedom and constraint
through conversation presupposes a significant degree of agency. See Michelman, supra note 25,
at 29-33. Sunstein confronts more directly the limitations imposed by the internalization of unjust
norms and acknowledges that "[w]hen there is inadequate information or opportunities, decisions
and even preferences should be described as unfree or nonautonomous." SUNSTEIN, sup-a note
25,

at 176.
37 See, e.g., Fleming, supa note 3o, at 288-89 (developing a theory of constitutional interpre-

tation based on the capacity of individuals to deliberate on their conceptions of the good).
38 Hirschmann, supra note 34, at 49.
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Agency, Citizenship, and Equal Protection: An Example

The Supreme Court's decision in VMI illustrates the connections
among constitutionalism, democracy, and mainstream assumptions
about identity. Although the case generated opinions exemplifying the
different poles of the mainstream debate over democracy and the
scope of fundamental rights, both the majority opinion and the dissent
reflect a shared assumption about individual agency. Consequently,
neither Justice Ginsburg's nor Justice Scalia's opinion offered a
searching analysis of the social meaning of VMII or the appropriate
role of the state in shaping norms of equality. Eschewing such analysis in favor of more familiar answers from within the logic of the democracy/fundamental rights debate, both Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Scalia disserve the principles of equality and participation, albeit in
different ways.
Justice Scalia, dissenting in the case, defended the power of the
people of Virginia to maintain a publicly-supported institution
designed to educate men as "citizen-soldiers."3 9 He accused the Court
of inscribing its own values in a wholly undemocratic fashion and ignoring the significance of the "decision of the people of Virginia to
maintain such an institution."40 Taking the position of a strong democrat, 4 1 Justice Scalia argued that "[t]he virtue of a democratic system
with a First Amendment is that it readily enables the people, over
time, to be persuaded that what they took for granted is not so, and to
change their laws accordingly." 42 He noted that "[t]he people may decide to change [a] tradition . . .through democratic processes; but the

assertion that [the] tradition has been unconstitutional through the
centuries is not law, but politics-smuggled-into-law. '43 Justice Scalia
also made clear his confidence in the ability of women to exercise
power through that democratic process. He explained that it is difficult "to consider women a 'discrete and insular minorit[y]' unable to
employ the 'political processes ordinarily to be relied upon,' when they
39 See United States v. Virginia (VMI), 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2294 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
40 Id. at 2292. A majority of Virginians seem to disagree with Justice Scalia on the institutional question. See Virginians Favor Settling VMI Case in Court, Not in General Assembly, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Jan. IS, i99', available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, US File (reporting that a majority
of state residents polled believed that the controversy over the school's admissions policy should
be settled in the federal courts, not the state legislature).
41 Of course, Justice Scalia is not fully committed to this position. In other cases, he has been
far less willing to defer to legislative judgment in the equal protection context. See, e.g., Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, z2x8 ('995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (expressing the view that "government can never have a 'compelling interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past racial discrimination in
the opposite direction" no matter what degree of political support such a measure might enjoy).
42 VMI, 1i6 S. Ct. at 2291-92 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia warned that "[t]hat system
is destroyed if the smug assurances of each age are removed from the democratic process and
written into the Constitution." Id. at 2292.
43 Id. at 2293.
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constitute a majority of the electorate. And the suggestion that they
are incapable of exerting that political power smacks of the same pa'44
ternalism that the Court so roundly condemns.
By invoking women's political authority as a justification for
VAI's all-male status, Justice Scalia's opinion reflects a conception of
public power and popular sovereignty that defines individual preferences as exogenous. He simply assumes that, given preexisting preferences, women (like any other interest group within the polity) are free
to exercise their power unproblematically through the democratic process. Yet, the preferences of the citizens of Virginia are not independent of institutions such as VMI, which define as their mission the
education of men as citizen-soldiers. 45 The existing power structure
contributes to the entrenchment of particular preferences, which in
turn influence the functioning of the democratic process. In Justice
Scalia's analysis, however, that influence remains unexamined.
Justice Scalia's unwillingness to inquire into the conditions of
women's political participation may stem from a belief that such an
inquiry, although relevant, is unnecessary because women do enjoy
equality. 4 6 An alternative explanation is that he views any inquiry
into the interdependence of agency, power, and democratic functioning
as simply beyond the scope of constitutional analysis. Whatever his
underlying assumption, Justice Scalia's analysis ignores the significance of gender inequality to democracy and therefore underprotects
47
women as citizens.
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion makes an assumption similar
to Justice Scalia's about individual preferences and agency, but the
problems arising from that assumption in her analysis are more subtle.
Justice Ginsburg rejected the state's argument that the exclusion of
women from VMI was necessary to accomplish its stated goal of educational diversity. First, she cited the lack of evidence in the record
that educational diversity was in fact the purpose in creating and
maintaining VVI,48 and emphasized that the state could not simply
rely on a post hoc rationale for discrimination.4 9 Second, she suggested that, to the extent that the "adversative" training of citizen44 Id. at 2296 (second alteration in original). This claim echoes Justice Scalia's argument concerning the political power of gays and lesbians in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. x620 (1996), also
decided this Term. See id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (insisting that, because gays and lesbians
"care about homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the public at large, they possess
political power much greater than their numbers, both locally and statewide').
45 See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2269.
46

Justice Scalia's list of women's successes in the legislative arena suggests that this is his

view. See id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47 See infra p. i681.
48

See VMI, 116 S. Ct. at 2277-79.

49 See id. at 2277. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist also rejected the post
hoc rationale. See id. at 2289-90 (Rehnquist, Cj., concurring).
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soldiers was the true raison d'etre of the school, that opportunity could
not be restricted to men based on the stereotypical assumption that
women are generally uninterested in -

or ill-suited to -

such train-

ing.50 The Equal Protection Clause was designed to restrict precisely
this type of overbroad stereotype.-5 Lacking an "exceedingly persuasive" reason for the male-only 5policy,
the state had violated the plain2
tiffs' right to equal protection.
Once this violation was established, VMVI had two options: it could
choose to admit women, or it could remain all-male but become a privately-supported institution.,5 3 Although Justice Ginsburg contemplated only the former, both of these options are consistent with the
requirement of gender neutrality in this context 5 4 Nevertheless, each
of the options illustrates a shortcoming of the majority's analysis. The
private-funding option poses a difficulty that is straightforward. That
VIU could avoid constitutional problems by remaining exactly the
same institution as long as it received no public funding perfectly illustrates a standard critique of our constitutional structure: by emphasizing state power, it leaves private power undisturbed.-' The other
option -

admitting women to VMI -

presents a difficulty that may

be fully felt only in future cases. By imposing a strong requirement of
state neutrality with respect to gender, the majority's reasoning does
not simply treat private power as irrelevant to equal protection but
potentially disempowers the state from acting to reallocate that power
in a gender-specific way.
To the extent that it is committed to state neutrality, the majority
has no clear basis for distinguishing VMI from an educational program that treats men and women differently in order to promote
equality. The majority did leave open the possibility that genderbased classifications may be used "to advance full development of the
talent and capacities of our Nation's people. '5 6 Yet, it declined to
elaborate the parameters of such uses of gender. For example, it is
unclear under the majority's analysis whether New York City's recently established girls' high school for math and science is an unconS0 See VMI, ix6 S. Ct. at 2279-80. Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the goal of creating
citizen-soldiers "is great enough to accommodate women, who today count as citizens in our
American democracy equal in stature to men." Id. at 2282.
S1 See id. at 2280.
52 Id. at 2282.

S3 The private funding option is implicit in the majority's careful limitation of its analysis to
state-supported institutions. See id. at 2280 (noting that "[s]tate actors controlling gates to oppor-

tunity, we have instructed, may not exclude qualified individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females'" (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 725 (x982))).
54 See id. at 2274 (noting that "[plarties who seek to defend gender-based government action
must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action" (emphasis added)).
SS See infra Part II.A (discussing feminist critiques of the state action requirement).
56 VMI, x16 S. Ct. at 2276.
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stitutional departure from gender neutrality or an innovative public
policy advancing the full development of the talents of girls in New
York.5 7

Neither the majority opinion nor the dissent in VMI adequately
confronted the interdependence of public and private power in the
regulation of gender. Whereas Justice Scalia ignored the influence of
prior state action on the expression of gender-specific preferences in
the democratic process, the majority focused solely on the need to limit
such state entrenchment of gender norms. In so doing, the majority
opinion calls into question the ability of the state to reshape those
norms to promote gender equality.
As VMI illustrates, the traditional formulation of the central constitutional problem as one of justifying judicially enforced constraints
on popular sovereignty fails adequately to capture the power structure
of patriarchy. By emphasizing the legitimacy and limitations of statesponsored power, mainstream constitutional theory turns away from
58
private inequality and powerlessness except at the margins.
Although reducing inequality may be deemed a precondition for democracy,5 9 the framework of constitutional theory precludes (or at
least discourages) an integrated critique of power. In contrast, feminist
theorists concerned with constitutional interpretation tend to criticize
ways in which public and private power intersect to facilitate
women's subordination. 60 Thus, feminists have taken as their political
objective the broad goal of creating the conditions for women's equality rather than the narrower one of creating the preconditions for
61
democracy.
II. FEMINISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Whereas mainstream constitutional theory rests on a conception of
citizenship but lacks a critique of power, feminist legal theory presents
a critique of power but lacks an affirmative conception of citizenship.
Responding to rights foundationalists, feminists have devoted considerable attention to a substantive critique of the Constitution's catalogue
S7 The New York program, called the Young Women's Leadership School, is located in District 4 in East Harlem. It is the only public all-girls school in New York City. The school currently serves 55 seventh grade students and will expand to include eighth and ninth grade
students next year. See Jacques Steinberg, Just Girls, and That's Fine with Them, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 1997, at Bi.
58 See supra p. 665.
59 See supra p. 1665.
60 See MAcKiNNON, supra note 5, at 157-70; WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM,

supra note 4, at 114-21.

61 Feminists may have chosen this objective because "men's forms of dominance over women
have been accomplished socially as well as economically, prior to the operation of law, without
express state acts, often in intimate contexts, as everyday life." MACMINNON, supra note 5, at 16I.
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of fundamental rights. 62 Responding to democrats, feminists have argued that, given women's historical exclusion from the public sphere, 63
our constitutional scheme fails on its own terms if its legitimacy depends upon popular will. 64 Notwithstanding the importance of these
critiques, feminist legal theorists generally have not taken up the task
of formulating an affirmative theory of constitutional legitimacy. Consequently, feminism has not offered a theory that adequately distinguishes VMI's policy from more egalitarian uses of gender
classifications or that limits the role of the Court in reviewing such
initiatives.
This Part attempts to account for this pattern of feminist scholarship first by describing the categories of questions that have concerned
feminist constitutional thinkers. These include most generally a criticism of mainstream theorists' emphasis on state action and disregard
of private power, and the further development of this critique in connection with the Constitution's equal protection guarantee and its protection of individual liberties. This review of feminist constitutional
critiques suggests that feminists may have declined to join the debate
over democracy and fundamental rights because the terms of the debate fail to engage many important concerns of women as individuals
and as citizens. This Part suggests, however, that the very failure of
traditional conceptions of constitutional legitimacy argues in favor of
developing a feminist theory of trustworthy democracy. The Part concludes by returning to Justice Scalia's challenge to judicial review in
VMI and asks whether the Court's invalidation of the school's admissions policy in the face of popular support calls into question feminist
political legitimacy. In short, it asks whether feminism itself is antidemocratic.
A.

Feminist Constitutional Critiques

i. Limits on Public but Not Private Power Fail to Protect
Women. - In feminist constitutional analysis, integrated theories of
power are often formulated as critiques of the public/private dichotomy. Such critiques are probably the best known and most developed
aspect of feminist constitutional analysis and serve as a foundation for
62 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 184-234 (challenging First Amendment and privacy

rights and equal protection doctrine as inadequate to protect women);

WEST, PROGRESSIVE CON-

supra note 4, at 129-43 (arguing for a broader conception of liberty); Law, supra
note 9, at 987-1013 (targeting equal protection doctrine).
63 See, e.g., CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT I-i8 (1988) (discussing the limitations on women's public participation and their connection to the social and sexual contract); see
also Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1776), in THE FEMINIST PAPERS: FROM
ADAMS TO DE BEAUVOIR 1O-11 (Alice S. Rossi ed., 1988) (entreating him to "Remember the Ladies"); Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776), in THE FEMINIST PAPERS,
supra, at xi (responding that "I cannot but laugh").
64 See PATEMAN, supra note 32, at 71-89.
STITUTIONALISM,
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more specific doctrinal analyses. 65 This analysis has usefully challenged the traditional primacy of public power in our constitutional
scheme by suggesting that, from the standpoint of the oppressed, the

source of power is less important than its distribution. In so doing,
however, feminist theorists have often neglected important differences
in the exercise and meaning of public and private power and have
therefore failed to construct a feminist conception of citizenship. This
section explores the strengths and limitations of such feminist constitutional critiques.

In the sometimes arcane language of feminist legal theory, the public/private dichotomy has two distinct but related meanings. "Private"
sometimes refers to the sphere of home and family (to which white,
educated, middle-class women have often been confined). Under this
definition, the counterpart "public" refers to the public sphere of the

market and the state. 66 In other contexts, feminist theorists adopt the
standard definition of the public/private line, according to which "private" refers to all nonstate action ranging from private employment to
67
home life, and "public" refers to the realm of governmental action.
Both versions of the public/private problem have been important
to the development of feminist constitutional analysis. Critiques of the
public/private dichotomy centering on the assumption that women's

proper place was the private sphere of home and family informed the
earliest constitutional litigation concerning women's rights. 68 Feminist
lawyers attacked the legitimacy of legislative classifications that excluded women from public activities ranging from lawyering, 69 to bartending,70 to voting.7 1 Their goal was to extend the general guarantee
6S See infra section II.A.2.
66 The most important example of the incorporation of this definition in U.S. constitutional
law is Justice Bradley's infamous concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1872). According to Justice Bradley, "[tihe paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother." Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). The
notion that women were out of place in the public sphere also informed the Court's approach to
gender-specific labor legislation, leading it to uphold such legislation while striking down labor
legislation protecting all workers. Compare Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (i9o8) (upholding
a maximum hours limitation for women), with Lochner v. New York, x98 U.S. 45, 64 (go5)
(striking down a maximum hours limitation for bakers).
67 Feminist theorists normally use the terms public and private in this sense when criticizing
the state action requirement. See, e.g., WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUiONALISM, supra note 4,
at rii, 139-20 (criticizing the state action requirement and emphasizing the contribution of private violence to women's inequality).
68 See Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 137-39 (rejecting Myra Bradwell's argument that denying her admission to the Illinois bar violated her rights under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
69 See id.
70 See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (rejecting an Equal Protection challenge to
a Michigan statute restricting women's employment as bartenders).
71 See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171-73 (875) (rejecting a Privileges and
Immunities Clause challenge to Missouri's gender-based restrictions on voting).
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of equality to women who had been hampered by state regulation of
their roles. Thus, to the extent that women suffered under official disadvantage in their quest to enter the professions and to work on equal
terms with men, the objective of feminist advocacy and constitutional
litigation was to7 2 open the public sector of the market by eliminating
state regulation.

This early and enduring impulse in constitutional litigation reflected a strategy to remove the state from the business of regulating
gender roles, particularly in ways that maintained women's
subordinate status.7 3 By championing a norm of gender neutrality,
this strategy also reflected the assumption that state inaction with respect to gender would best ensure women's equality. Although dating
back almost a century to Myra Bradwell, this approach found its fullest realization in the legal initiative led by Ruth Bader Ginsburg on
behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union in the 197os.7 4 Ginsburg
challenged legislative classifications that differentiated between men
and women, often choosing as plaintiffs men who were disadvantaged
by the classification.

75

Despite its success, this strategy may have overestimated the value
of gender neutrality and -underestimated the possibilities for affirmative state intervention on behalf of women.7 6 Indeed, its limitations
became evident when, despite the gradual elimination of state-sponsored barriers to women's participation in the public sphere, the economic and political subordination of women continued. This
persistent inequality in the face of formally equal treatment by the
state has led many feminists to conclude that strengthening constitu72 Of course, this idealization of the feminine and the relegation of women to the sphere of
home and family has not affected all women in the same way. Many African-American women,
poor women, immigrant women, and others have been relegated not to the home but historically
to slavery or to the lowest echelons of the work force. Nevertheless, for all women, the public!
private distinction helped to create and maintain gender-based segregation in work - both inside
and outside the home.
73 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 69o-9i (1973) (invalidating a requirement
for women - but not men - to prove the dependency of their spouses in order to receive fringe
benefits in military service); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 7M, 75-77 (197') (invalidating an Idaho probate law that established a mandatory preference for men over women as administrators of

estates).
74 For an interesting discussion of Ruth Bader Ginsburg's strategy in these early cases, see

Law, supra note 9, at 979-80.
75 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren,

429 U.S. 190, 2o8-io (i976) (finding that an Oklahoma law establishing a higher drinking age for men than for women violated the equal protection rights of the
male plaintiff).
76 Even in hindsight, it is difficult to conclude that the strategy was a mistake. Formal equality was probably the only basis upon which the Supreme Court would have extended heightened

scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause to gender. Nevertheless, this approach was controversial from the start, generating the contentious "special treatment/equal treatment" debate. Cf.
Wendy W. Williams, Notes from a First Generation, 1989 U. CH. LEGAL F. 99, xo5 (discussing
the debate but arguing that the differences between the positions were more a matter of emphasis
than an actual disagreement).
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tional limits on state action is simply inadequate to protect women
against the forces that most undermine their liberty and equality.
The conception of the public/private line as demarcating the
boundary between state and nonstate action is central to this critique.
Constitutional constraints on state action enhance women's equality
only when subordination is a direct product of such action."7 Moreover, the Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to view state
responsibility broadly, resisting arguments based on state complicity in
private subordination. 73 Thus, manifestations of inequality ranging
from the systematic economic disadvantage that women experience
due to their disproportionate responsibilities within the family 79 to the
persistent threat of gender-based violence in the home and the workplace and on the streets, 0 have not been understood as a product of
state action and therefore are not considered appropriate candidates
for constitutional adjudication.8 1
2. Limits on State Action Prevent States from Fostering Women's
Equality. - Feminists have argued that limiting constitutional con82
straints to state action leaves women unprotected in important ways.
That is, constitutional protections as currently understood are too narrow to secure women's liberty and equality. In addition, feminist theorists have begun to address the possibility that these constitutional
constraints may limit state regulation of private sources of inequality

77 See WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 4, at 119-2o (using the example
of sexual violence to illustrate that limits on state action improve women's equality only when the
action directly subordinates women).
78 See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989)
(holding that a state's failure to protect a child from private violence did not violate his Due
Process rights). But see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. i, I9 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant constituted state action for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
79 See generally ARLIE HoCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT 277-84
(1989) (exploring the implications of an unequal allocation of responsibilities within the home);

SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 3-6 (1989) (arguing for the inclusion
of the family within a broad theory of justice).
80 See, e.g., MARGARET T. GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR 8-22 (1989)
(discussing the fear of sexual violence that pervades many women's lives); see also MACKINNON,
supra note 5, at 167-79 (discussing the relationship between the pervasive threat of sexual violence and nonconsent as an element of rape); Catharine A. MacKinnon, A Rally Against Rape, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 12, at 81, 81-84 (positing a connection between gender inequality and women's experience of rape); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sex and Violence: A Perspective, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 12, at 85, 85-92 (integrating rape, sexual harassment,
pornography, and battery in a general theory of sexual violence).
81 Robin West observes: "[T]he Constitution does not prohibit the abuse of private power that
interferes with the equality or freedom of subordinated peoples. The Constitution simply does not
reach private power, and therefore cannot possibly prohibit its abuse." WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 4, at 164.
82 See supra section l.A.i.
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and oppression.8 3 Viewed in this way, constitutional limits may be too
broad to permit women to exercise political power to promote

equality.
For example, the Supreme Court has moved increasingly toward
an interpretation of equal protection as a guarantee of neutral treat84
ment by the state with respect to race and, to a lesser extent, gender.
In other words, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees that the state
will treat citizens as individuals rather than as part of race- or genderdefined groups. Women have successfully invoked this interpretation
of equal protection as a means of challenging differential treatment by

the state.8 5 The most recent example is, of course, the Court's decision
in VMI. Nevertheless, the victory in VMI may come back to haunt

feminist lawyers. In the context of race, the Supreme Court has interpreted the equal protection requirement strictly even with respect to

legislative measures adopted by a majority that benefit rather than
harm minority groups. 8 6 Extending this analysis to gender-based clas-

sifications87 may ultimately hurt women by restricting their exercise of
legislative power in gender-specific ways to foster women's equality.8 8

Feminists have also criticized the Constitution's protection of individual liberty as fostering gender inequality when that protection is
83 Some familiar examples of such regulation on the federal level include: Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (r994); the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 26o-2654 (1994); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2 (I994);
and the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, io8 Stat. 1902,
1902-55 (1994). On the state and local level, examples include statutes regulating pornography,
see, e.g., Indianapolis, Ind., Code § 16-3 (1984) (creating a cause of action based on trafficking in
pornography), and reforms of domestic violence and sexual assault statutes, see, e.g., Minnesota
Domestic Abuse Act, MINN. STAT. § 518B.oI (1992) (reforming standards for orders of protection
for victims of domestic violence). The Indianapolis antipornography statute was struck down as
unconstitutional by the Seventh Circuit in American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d
323 (7th Cir. i985).
84 As Robin West explains, the "guiding assumption [of this model of formal equality] is that
all persons - women, men, blacks, whites, and others - are more or less the same with respect
to the traits and issues that affect or should affect political decision making." WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 4, at 53.
85 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., Si U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (jury service); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 69o-92 (1973) (spousal benefits); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)
(executors of estates). But see Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 472-73 (298i) (opinion
of Rehnquist, J.) (statutory rape); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974) (pregnancy
benefits).
86 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, xiu S. Ct. 2097, 2112 (i995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1989) (Opinion of O'Connor, J.).
87 See United States v. Virginia, ii6 S. Ct. 2264, 2275 (I996) (requiring an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for sex-based classifications).
88 This has not yet happened, and the Court's commitment to something less than strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications suggests that affirmative action based on gender may survive
Adarand. However, it is difficult to imagine even Justice Scalia (who suggested in VMI that if
the level of scrutiny of gender classifications is to change, it should be lowered rather than raised,
see id. at 2295-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) supporting affirmative action for women but not racial
minorities.
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confined to state action. As Robin West argues, "[A]t least a good deal
of the time, in the name of guaranteeing constitutional protection of
individual freedom, [the Constitution] also aggressively protects the
very hierarchies of wealth, status, race, sexual preference, and gender
that facilitate those practices of subordination."8 9 West and others focus on the protection of familial privacy as potentially undermining
women's liberty.90 For women, recognition of a constitutional right of
privacy has meant a qualified protection of decisional autonomy in the
area of reproduction. 9 1 West argues, however, that "if patriarchal control of women's choices and patriarchal domination of women's inner
and public lives occur in the very private realm of home life[,] then
the Constitution, above all else, protects the very system of power and
92
control that constrains us."

Thus, beyond criticizing the accepted catalogue of negative liberties
as inadequate to protect women's liberty or ensure our equality, feminists have argued that the particular set of rights may actually reinforce women's inequality. Once again, the system of constitutional
guarantees of negative liberties not only fails as a sword in the hands
of women, it operates as a shield to patriarchy.
B. Feminist Alternatives
x. Dominance Analysis. - Existing interpretations of equal protection and individual liberties, coupled with the state action limitation, offer inadequate constitutional protection for women and may
frustrate legislative initiatives targeting private inequality. The challenge for feminist constitutional theorists, therefore, is to offer an alternative interpretative theory that protects women's constitutional rights
while permitting constructive legislative uses of gender-based categories. Dominance analysis provides the most promising basis for such a
theory.

93

note 4, at 165.
90 See id. at i4-2I; see also MAcKINNON, supra note 5, at 184-94 (offering a critique of the
right of privacy as a foundation for abortion rights).
91 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, So5 U.S. 833, 846, 879-90o (1992) (reaffirming Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (i973), but holding that the medical emergency definition, informed consent
requirements, 24-hour waiting period, parental consent provision, and reporting requirement of
the statute at issue were valid).
92 WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 4, at xig. But see Linda C. McClain, Inviolability and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuay, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. &
HumAN. 195, 207-20 (i995) (noting that courts have not invoked the constitutional right of privacy to defend marital rape exemptions or to shield domestic violence from state intervention).
93 Catharine MacKinnon offered the earliest and fullest articulation of dominance analysis.
See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1-7 (1979);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM UN.
MODIFIED, supra note 12, at 32, 32-45; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under Law, ioo YALE L.J. 1281, 1281-1328 (i99i) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Reflections]. Others
have contributed significantly to the development of the approach. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker,
89 WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONST1TUTIONALISM, supra
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Dominance analysis first emerged as a response to the "equal treat94
ment/special treatment" debate over pregnancy and parental leave.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of equal protection as requiring
the state to treat the same those similarly situated had created a dilemma for feminist advocates. Women could argue for the same treat-

ment as men, on the theory that gender differences do not matter.95
However, doing so has sometimes meant having gender-specific needs
ignored.96 Alternatively, women could argue for special treatment,
taking into account gender differences. 9 7 But, under this analysis, such
98
differences could also justify treatment disadvantaging women.

Offering a way out of this dilemma, dominance analysis examines
the role of law in reinforcing gender inequality.99 In the context of
judicial review, dominance analysis asks whether the challenged legislative category contributes to women's subordination. 10 0 If it does, it
should be struck down under an antisubordination interpretation of
equal protection. If, however, the legislative category promotes gender

equality, it should be upheld as a legitimate use of state power.' 0 ' Appealing in its simplicity, dominance analysis also fits well in the
Supreme Court's scheme of intermediate scrutiny for gender-based

Prince Charming: Abstract Equality, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 201, 202-12 (discussing difference, dominance, and the problem of pregnancy); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75
CAL. L. REv. 1279, 1279-1337 (2987) (discussing dominance and comparability of sex differences).
94 Compare Wendy W. Williams, Equality'sRiddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special reatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 352-70 (1984-1985) (arguing that
pregnancy should be understood in a gender-neutral, functional way), with MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 93, at 1308-09 (arguing for dominance rather than neutrality as a criterion for
evaluating gender-based classifications).
95 See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975) (striking down a statute establishing a
lower age of majority for females than for males); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 72, 77 (I971) (invalidating a mandatory preference for men over women as administrators of estates); Williams, supra
note 94, at 352-54.
96 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) (rejecting a challenge to California's
exclusion of pregnancy-related medical expenses from its employee's insurance plan); see also
Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive
Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 513, 536-64 (2983)
(criticizing Geduldig and arguing the necessity of special accommodations for pregnancy to ensure
workplace equality).
97 See Henna Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, i BERKELEY
WOMEN's L.J. 1, 22-28 (1985) (arguing for treating sex differences as significant, but limiting that
significance to discrete episodes of pregnancy); Krieger & Cooney, supra note 96, at 536-64.
98 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (ig8i) (holding that sex differences justify different rules for consenting to sexual intercourse for young men and women);
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 497 (upholding a state insurance scheme that excluded pregnancy from
covered conditions).
99 See, e.g., MacKinnon, Reflections, supra note 93, at 1298-1300.
100 See id. at 1318-19 (discussing the application of dominance analysis to laws depriving
women of reproductive control).
101 See, e.g., id. at 1307-8 (using dominance analysis to defend the constitutionality of laws
protecting the rights of victims of sexual assault).
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classifications. 102 If the Court assumes that some gender-based classifications are legitimate while others are not, dominance analysis offers
10 3
a criterion for drawing the line.
Although dominance analysis begins to address the basic deficiencies of mainstream equal protection doctrine, the approach suffers
from two distinct but related shortcomings. First, determining
whether a legislative classification contributes to or undermines
women's equality has become increasingly difficult. The issue raised
in the VMI case itself - the legitimacy of state-supported single-sex
schools - is a good example of the difficulty. Although most feminists would probably agree that the particular characteristics and history of the Virginia Military Institute suggest that its gender-based
admissions policy undermined women's equality, they would probably
disagree about other all-male institutions. 0 4 Feminists also disagree
about the efficacy and legitimacy of state-sponsored all-female
schools.' 0 5 This disagreement among feminists is part of a broader de-

102 Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted dominance analysis, Justice Ginsburg suggests in VMI that an antisubordination rationale might guide the application of heightened scrutiny. See United States v. Virginia, xz6 S. Ct. 2264, 2276 (1996).
103 The analysis has also been extended beyond the equal protection context to modify the
interpretation of individual liberties. Some of MacKinnon's arguments about the limitations of
privacy doctrine can be interpreted as applications of dominance analysis to the scope of personal
privacy. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 184-94 (discussing abortion as a right of privacy); see also WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTUTIONALISM, supra note 4, at 165 (discussing the
right of privacy in the home). For example, in the context of First Amendment doctrine, feminist
theorists and critical race scholars have used a form of dominance analysis to defend restrictions
on narrow categories of speech based on harm to subordinated groups. See, e.g., CATHARINE A.
MAcKiNNON, ONLY WORDS 71-110 (1993) (discussing the equality implications of free speech
doctrine); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2357-60 (1989) (arguing for narrow restrictions on racist speech based on an
anti-subordination rationale).
104 Some feminists support the creation of all-male public schools designed to address the educational problems of inner-city students. For example, feminist law professor Susan Estrich filed
an amicus brief in support of Virginia in VMI to argue for the importance of single-sex public
education for both girls and boys. See Brief of Kenneth E. Clark et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 9-13, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (x996) (No. 94-1941)
(describing the advantages of single-sex education and supporting local experimentation with such
programs). See also Michael McGough, Romeboys: The Case for Single-Sex Schools, NEW REPUB.
LIC, Dec. 16, 1991, at 13, 16 (citing feminist work on adolescent development to support single-sex

education for both boys and girls).
10s The amicus briefs in VMI provide a good illustration of this divide. A number of the

briefs are signed by feminist scholars or cite feminist scholarship to support or to criticize singlesex education. Compare Brief of Kenneth E. Clark et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9-13, United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 94-1941) (supporting singlesex public education for both girls and boys), with Brief of The American Association of University Professors et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22-28, United States v. Virginia,
116 S. Ct. 2264 (x996) (No. 94-1941) (disputing the evidence supporting single-sex education, especially for boys and men).
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bate within society about the wisdom and
effectiveness of gender-spe06
cific programs in schools and elsewhere.
Second, dominance analysis as applied to gender-based categories is
insufficiently rooted in democratic theory. That is, under dominance
analysis, the often difficult task of assessing the impact and meaning
of gender-based classifications is assigned to the judiciary rather than
to the legislature. When dominance analysis is employed to protect a
numerical minority, such as an ethnic or racial group, good reasons
exist for empowering the judiciary to review legislation for abuses by
the majority. Even if the members of such a group vote in a cohesive
way, they will not prevail in the democratic process when their interests conflict with the majority's. 10 7 In contrast, women are in a position to exercise considerable power through *the majoritarian
process.' 03 As Justice Scalia observed in VMI, women are not a "'discrete and insular minoritfy]' unable to employ the 'political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon."' 0 9 Thus, the argument for judicial review of gender-based legislation is more attenuated than for judicial
review of legislation concerning other subordinated groups. If the impact of gender-based legislation is contested and difficult to resolve,
perhaps the gender-balanced electorate rather than an overwhelmingly
male and politically unaccountable judiciary should determine the legitimacy of such legislation. To conclude that the judiciary rather
than the electorate should define the limits of the use of gender-based
classifications requires two assumptions: that the oppression of women
as citizens prevents them from protecting their interests in the democratic process, and that judges will protect those interests more effectively. Although both assumptions may be valid, they deserve
examination.
106 Applying dominance analysis outside the context of equal protection doctrine has also generated controversy. For example, the issue whether the regulation of pornography fosters or undermines women's expression has divided feminists for almost two decades. See Kathryn

Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 05 COLUM. L. REV.
304, 304-07 (1995) (describing the sex wars of the ig8os and comparing them to current divisions
within feminism concerning women's sexuality); Carole S. Vance, More Danger,More Pleasure:A
Decade After the Barnard Sexuality Conference, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE
SEXUALITY xviii-xx (Carole S. Vance ed., 1992) (describing the rise of the antipornography movement and the divisions that it created within feminism). Thus, regarding increasingly subtle and
controverted gender-based effects, dominance analysis does not yield a clear result.
107 The Supreme Court observed in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 3o4 U.S. 144
(1938), that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id.
at 153 n.4.
103 The claim that women may exercise legislative power in a majoritarian process does not
depend on the assumption that women will always vote in unison. If they do act in a concerted
way, however, they will not systematically be outvoted.
109 United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct 2264, 2296 (i996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Carotene Products, 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.
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2.The Appeal and Risks of Democracy. - Even if courts were to
embrace dominance analysis as a framework to interpret the Constitution,1 10 given the disagreement over its application, feminist constitutional theorists would have to consider whether privileging courts over
legislatures is warranted. Mary Becker argues that the case for judicial review under a flawed Constitution that is interpreted by an overwhelmingly male judiciary is very weak in a state where women
comprise a majority of the electorate."' She invites feminists to consider whether women might be better off under a system of nonbinding judicial review (or even no judicial review) that assigns the
interpretation and protection of constitutional guarantees to executives
and legislatures, which are more directly accountable to women voters. 1 2 Becker also argues that judicial review tends to quell experimentation in legislative solutions to social problems. 113 Such
experimentation is particularly important in areas where society lacks
consensus, including a substantive vision of gender equality.1 4 Robin
West also asks whether "a more restrained Court, and a less vigorously
enforced Constitution, [would] be an improvement over our present
constitutional institutions, from an explicitly progressive political viewpoint."" S This question is a legitimate one in a polity in which
women potentially wield considerable power. 116 Perhaps women
would be better off struggling in the fray of the majoritarian process
than relying on the enlightenment of the countermajoritarian Court.
Nevertheless, despite the appeal of policy experimentation and the
potential for women's exercise of their political power, this approach
110 Notwithstanding Justice Ginsburg's suggestion in VMI that gender-based categories might
be constitutional if based on inherent differences or used for remedial or benign purposes, see
VMI, ii6 S. Ct. at 2279-84, the Supreme Court has moved steadily away from dominance or
antisubordination analysis in the context of race. Compare Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 564-65 (iggo) (holding that "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress ...
are constitutionally permissible"), with Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct 2097, 2Mt3
('995) (holding that "all racial classifications . . .must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny").
"'l See Becker, supra note 3, at 98o-81.
112 Arguing against binding judicial review, Becker raises several different problems with reliance on judicial power. First, she cites the possibility of judicial bias, noting that "[f]ederal judges
are members of a small elite professional class and are overwhelmingly white men." Id. at 987.
Consequently, "[tihey are likely to decide open cases in light of their own experiences, perceptions,
needs, and interests and those of other members of their class." Id.
113 See id. at 99o-9i. Becker quotes Justice Brandeis's warning that "in the exercise of this
high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles." Id.
at 99o (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 28o (x931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). She notes that "[wjhen the Court closes off certain approaches as unconstitutional, it may
make exceedingly difficult or preclude the development of appropriate solutions." Id. at 991.
114 See id.
11

WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 4, at 290.

116 This question is particularly salient in light of the Court's narrow interpretation of equal
protection and its limitations on the permissible scope of gender- and race-specific classifications.
See supra section ILA.2.
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has risks. Although the threat of judicial bias is indisputable, 1 7 relying uncritically on women's access to political power is problematic.
Indeed, that Justice Scalia advocates such reliance in his VMI dissent
should give pause to feminist democrats."" Proclaiming the virtues of
democratic process, Justice Scalia excoriated the Court for reading into
the Constitution the biases of our age and thereby limiting the scope
of democratic evolution of social norms." 9 He championed the workings of democracy and noted that women, in fact, are in a position to
exercise considerable power in the process.' 20 Thus, he argued that
the continuing state support of VMI must be presumed to reflect that
power. To suggest otherwise, he asserted, would constitute paternalism.121 With this logic, Justice Scalia claimed VI for the women of

Virginia even while denying them the right to enter. He made the
protection of that institution a matter of respecting women's rights as
citizens.
Why are many feminists less sanguine than Justice Scalia about the
promise that democracy holds for women? The feminist critiques of
fundamental rights and equal protection suggest one answer. If the
Constitution, as it is currently construed, is inadequate to secure
women's liberty and equality, then the political process cannot be assumed to offer women equal opportunities for exercising power. More
specifically, if existing constitutional rights fall well short of addressing
122
the most important constraints on women's autonomy and equality,
then women incompletely protected by those liberties cannot be considered fully constituted citizens within our democracy. Relatively less
free than men under the same catalogue of individual rights, women
are therefore less capable of protecting their interests through the democratic process. In short, women are failed both by fundamental rights
23
and by democracy.'

117 See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Toward a Courtroom of One's Own: An Appellate Court
Judge Looks at Gender Bias, 6x U. CIN. L. REV. 1209, 1209-21 (1993) (discussing the discovery of
gender bias in the courts, gender-biased discourse, and the effects of feminist values on some
appellate judges); Christine M. Durham, Gender Equality in the Courts: Women's Work Is Never
Done, 57 FORDHAM L. RaV. 981, 981-83 (I989) (same); Deborah R. Hensler, Studying Gender
Bias in the Courts: Stories and Statistics, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2187, 2188-93 (1993) (presenting a

statistical comparison of the gender makeup of different courts).
118 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2292 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119 See id. at 2291-92.
120 See id. at 2296 (citing "a long list of legislation" disproving the proposition that women
lack political power or require special protection in the legislative process).
121 See id.

122 See supra pp. 1671-74.

123 This explanation serves as a partial response to process perfectors who insist that women,
unlike discrete and insular minorities, do not require special protection against encroachment by
majoritarian decisionmaking. For the most famous of such accounts, see ELY, supra note i, at
164-7o.

1682

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

(Vol. IIOa657

Framing the dilemma as a choice between reliance on courts to
realize a particular vision of equality and reliance on the democratic
process to protect women's interests returns feminists to a version of
the sameness/difference debate that dominance theorists intended to resolve. 124 On one hand, feminists can assume that equality already exists within the democratic process and concentrate on mobilizing
women's power in that arena. Yet to do so contradicts a sense that
women do not enjoy equal power. On the other hand, feminists can
assume that women suffer systematic disadvantage in the democratic
process and rely on judicial review to constrain the power of that process. Yet to do so risks empowering courts to enforce a vision of
equality that is at odds with feminist political commitments. In order
to avoid the consequences of either extreme, feminist legal theorists
must develop a theory that both enables women's meaningful democratic participation and preserves the scope of democratic action.
3. Toward a Feminist Theory of Trustworthy Democracy. - Feminists have not understood the dilemma of constitutional democracy to be ruled by ourselves collectively and to be ruled by law125 - as a
reflection of competing formulations of women's freedom. For women,
being ruled by law (constitutional commitment enforced through judicial review) has often meant being ruled by men, both privately and
publicly.1 26 Although the alternative, to be ruled by ourselves collectively, holds the promise of power for women, it has been realized
only inconsistently. In short, the tension between fundamental rights
and democratic self-governance changes when viewed through the lens
of gender inequality. Consequently, the tension between democracy
and constitutionalism reflected in the traditional formulation of the
countermajoritarian difficulty does not offer a'particularly useful
framework for analyzing the implications for women of the allocation
of power in the liberal state.
Notwithstanding these limitations of mainstream constitutional theory, feminists should not dismiss the influence of this discourse in
shaping our basic constitutional framework. As the preceding overview of feminist constitutional analysis suggests, arguments for judicial
protection of constitutional rights have met with limited success when
measured against the goal of women's equality, broadly defined.
Moreover, if the Supreme Court moves away from an antisubordination analysis of equal protection and toward a norm of gender-blindness, judicial review may interfere with women's efforts to protect
124 See supra
125

section 3I.B.i.

See Michelman, supra note 2, at 1500.

126 As Catharine MacKinnon observes: "The Constitution ...with its interpretations assumes
that society, absent government intervention, is free and equal; that its laws, in general, reflect
that; and that government need and should right only what government has previously wronged."
MACKINNON, supra note 5, at x63.
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themselves. 127 For these reasons, feminists may increasingly come to
rely on arguments from popular sovereignty to assess and to defend
women's exercise of power in the democratic process. Feminists must
therefore consider more systematically the preconditions for trustworthy democracy in order to ensure that majoritarian institutions adequately reflect women's status as citizens. In short, feminist legal
theorists should develop a conception of citizenship to accompany their
well-developed critique of power.
From a feminist standpoint, then, what are the preconditions for
women's effective political participation? An initial answer might be
simply suffrage for women.' 28 Yet, although women have enjoyed the
franchise for over seventy-five years, 2 9 few feminists (indeed perhaps
few women) would conclude that women as a group have experienced
the full measure of their potential political power.'3 Women have begun to vote at a rate equal to men only within the last thirteen
years.' 3 ' The concept of a "gender gap" - evidence of a gender-defined pattern of voting - has emerged only in the last several
32
elections.'
If equal access to the ballot is necessary but not sufficient to establish the legitimacy of democratic outcomes from a feminist standpoint,
what else is required? What material and social preconditions would
have to be met before Justice Scalia could persuade feminists to defer
to democratic outcomes? Returning to the VMI case, suppose that a
referendum were organized, permitting the women of Virginia and
South Carolina to decide the issue of coeducation at VMI and the Citadel.' 33 Even if the voting were restricted to women, polls indicate
that the outcome would be in doubt.'3 4 By no means does a clear
127
128

See supra pp. x674-76.

See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 3 (i991) (noting the centrality of voting to
an individual's status as a citizen). The idea that voting is central to citizenship, and even personhood, can be traced to Aristotle. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 87 (Carnes Lord trans., 1984).
129 American women obtained the right to vote in 1920 through the enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment, which provides: "The rights of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX.
130 Even Ely concedes that women have operated under constraints in their exercise of the
franchise. See ELY, Supra note i, at 164 (noting that "women have been operating at an unfair
disadvantage in the political process," but expressing uncertainty regarding the reasons for this
disadvantage).
131 See Sandra Day O'Connor, The History of the Women's Suffrage Movement, 49 VAND. L.
REv. 657, 669 (I996) (noting that, with the exception of the 1952 presidential election, women's
rate of participation in national elections did not equal men's until 1984).
132 See id. at 669-70. For a discussion of the paradox of women as a majority class without
majority power, see JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage for
the Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 16o-2O4, 209-10 (1994).
133 1 am indebted to Jack Balkin for this formulation of the question.
134 The most recent available poll of Virginians on the status of VMI, conducted by the Virginia Commonwealth University in I9go, demonstrates that Virginians are divided on this issue.
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majority of women in either state support admitting women to the
schools. 135 Given that feminists, too, have divided over the issue of
coeducation, 3 6 under what circumstances would they be willing to accept the judgment of the voters of Virginia?
In light of Professor Becker's (and Justice Scalia's) support for experimentation in social policy regarding gender equality, how should
feminists interpret and respond to the considered support among
women for the traditions of VMI and the Citadel? Does that support
simply represent an alternative conception of gender equity? A commitment to diversity in education? Under what circumstances are
feminists obliged to accede to or support the democratically expressed
choices of women as citizens? Would, as Justice Scalia suggests, re137
jecting those choices constitute paternalism?
These questions raise the difficult and persistent issue concerning
the gap between feminism as a political movement and the group that
feminists purport to represent - women. To return to the VMI example, consider a different referendum on the status of the school. Would
feminists vote to authorize the women of Virginia to decide the issue
of coeducation definitively, without the possibility of judicial review?
If not, what does this conclusion suggest about the relationship between feminism and women, or between feminist theory and democracy? In order to answer these questions, feminist constitutional
theorists must develop an affirmative account of democratic citizenship
in which women's political participation is meaningful and reliable.

III.

AGENCY AND FEMINIST THEORIES OF THE SELF

The preceding Parts have suggested that mainstream and feminist
constitutional theorizing suffer from distinct but related shortcomings.
Mainstream constitutional theory offers a conception of citizenship,
but, as feminist constitutional analysis reveals, it lacks a critique of
The poll reported that 44% of respondents believed that the school should become coeducational,
40% believed that it should remain all-male, and 16% expressed no opinion. The poll provided
no gender breakdown. See Poll: VMI Should Admit Women, UPI, Feb. x3, i99o, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
135 In South Carolina, polling data from 1994 revealed that almost two-thirds of state residents
favored maintaining the all-male status of the Citadel. Among the group of respondents favoring
the status quo, men and women were fairly evenly represented. See Most S. Carolinians Want
Citadel to Remain All-Male, Poll Shows, ST. Louis DISPATCH, Apr. 3, 1994, at 2B.
136 For example, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese testified at trial on behalf of VMI. She specifically
testified in favor of the adequacy of the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership at Mary Baldwin College. See Dianne Avery, Institutional Myths, Historical Narratives and Social Science
Evidence: Reading the "Record" in the Virginia Military Institute Case, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. &
WOMEN'S STUD. 189, 282-98 (x996) (discussing Professor Fox-Genovese's testimony). In contrast,
Professor Carol Gilligan filed a brief opposing the all-male policy. See Brief of The American
Association of University Professors et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3-2o,
United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) (No. 94-1941).
137 See United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2296 (x996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

1997]

DEMOCRACY AND FEMINISM

1685

power. In turn, feminist legal theory offers a critique of power but, as
Part II argues, it lacks a conception of citizenship. Both are incomplete. Parts III and IV begin to develop a feminist theory of citizenship and democratic legitimacy that responds to both the limitations of

mainstream constitutional theory and the shortcomings of feminist
constitutional critique.
Despite their relative inattention to the issue of democratic legitimacy in constitutional theory, feminist theorists have grappled with

their own version of the tension between democratic will and fundamental rights. The problem arises because feminism seeks both to rep-

resent women in their complexity and diversity and to defend a
particular substantive agenda. 138 On one hand, like mainstream demo-

crats, most feminist theorists premise the legitimacy of political norms,
either explicitly or implicitly, on the assent of those bound by such

norms.' 3 9 On the other hand, like rights-based theorists, feminists are
committed to respecting claims that are foundational to women's lib-

erty and equality.' 40 As to these claims, individual preferences should
not be indulged, and competing visions have no place.

Feminism's commitment to both an often controversial substantive
agenda and respect for women's conflicting accounts of their experi-

ence creates a feminist analogue to the countermajoritarian
lemma.'

41

di-

The first section of this Part examines this tension in more

138 For a discussion of this debate in the context of international human rights, see generally
Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism,Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ.89,
89-126 (r996) (arguing that feminism must take cultural defenses seriously, especially defenses
articulated by women).
139 Feminists make this assumption explicitly perhaps less often than constitutional theorists,
yet it is implicit in every feminist argument in favor of the inclusion of marginalized voices and in
every criticism of mainstream jurisprudence as premised on masculine imperatives. See, e.g.,
Marl J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S.CAL. L. REv.
1763, 1764-68 (iggo) [hereinafter Matsuda, Pragmatism](advocating attention to the voices of the
oppressed); Marl J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, ii WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 7, 7-10 (1989) (discussing multiple consciousness as an
aspect of jurisprudential method); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, o3
HARv. L. REv. 829, 867-88 (iggo) (discussing feminist explanations for what it means to be
"right" in law, including the rational/empirical position, standpoint epistemology, and
postmodernism).
140 See, e.g., ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT 160-64 (1988) (identifying exclusionary tendencies in feminist theory and
calling for greater recognition of differences among women); Martha Minow, Feminist Reason:
Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 47-48 (x988) (same).
141 Summarizing the dilemma, Deborah Rhode asks: "Who can claim to represent the interests
of women when women themselves disagree about what those interests are, when their perceptions may be constrained by systemic inequalities, and when their concerns vary substantially
across race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and so forth?" Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and
the State, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1181, i89 (1994).
Even MacKinnon, the feminist most often criticized for espousing a rigid feminist orthodoxy,
acknowledges the problem of accounting for dissent within a political theory premised on listening
to women. See MACKiNNON, supra note S, at 115-16 (discussing the problem of "[a]uthority of
interpretation"). She does not resolve the problem, however, and has been criticized for failing to
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detail, notes several responses, and suggests parallels to constitutional
theory. The second section attempts to explain why feminists have analyzed the countermajoritarian dilemma as a problem of social structure rather than of political institutions.
A.

Authority and Legitimacy of Feminist Claims
Feminist theory and political advocacy entail two commitments
that are sometimes in conflict: a commitment to the authority of
women as individuals to define and describe their own experience and
a commitment to transforming that experience through politics. 14 2 The
first commitment has been central to feminism both substantively and
methodologically. Substantively, feminists have emphasized the importance of including and strengthening women's voices in public and
private life in order to enhance women's power. 143 Methodologically,
feminism has sought to derive its substantive agenda directly from a
process of women articulating their experiences and defining them as
political. 44 Early in second wave feminism, 45 this process entailed
consciousness-raising, a method in which small groups of women share
their experiences and come to understand them as connected politically. 146 Although consciousness-raising has become more metaphor
than method, this commitment to women's articulated experience remains central to standpoint epistemology - the idea that the enlightened perspectives of marginalized people ought to be treated as having
47
particular authority.
The second commitment, to the transformation of women's experience through politics, bears a complex relationship to feminism's reptake seriously competing feminist visions. See, e.g., Open Letters to Catharine MacKinnon, 4
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM I77, 177-9o (I991) (criticizing MacKinnon's failure to respond adequately
to critiques by women of color).
142 Drucilla Cornell explains this dilemma as follows:

If there is to be feminism at all, as a movement unique to women, we must rely on a
feminine voice and a feminine "reality" that can be identified as such and correlated with
the lives of actual women. Yet all accounts of the Feminine seem to reset the trap of rigid
gender identities, deny the real differences among women (white women have certainly
been reminded of this danger by women of color), and reflect the history of oppression and
discrimination rather than an ideal to which we ought to aspire.
Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L.
REv. 644, 644-45 (199o).
143 See, e.g., Matsuda, Pragmatism, supra note 139, at 1764-66.
144 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 83-1o5 (describing consciousness-raising as

method).
145 "Second wave" feminism as used here means the modern feminist movement beginning in
the late Ig6os and early 197os. The "first wave" of feminism in the United States culminated in

the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.
146 See MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 83-io5.
147 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 139, at 872-77, 88o--88 (considering "standpoint epistemology"
but preferring "positionality'); Matsuda, Pragmatism, supa note 139, at 1764-68; Robin L. West,
The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal TheOy, 3 WiS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 142-44 (987).
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resentational claim. Feminism's substantive and methodological
emphasis on women's voices reflects the notion that the group that
feminism purports to (or at least aspires to) represent is not feminists
but women. 148 Why this should be the case is not obvious. The core
political commitments of feminists could define feminism as a movement in much the same way that a set of political commitments defines Republicans or Democrats. And yet, for feminists, that definition
has never been sufficient. Rather, feminism as a political movement
has explicitly sought to articulate claims on women's behalf. This representational claim could be understood as merely strategic, allowing
feminists to claim all women as their political constituency. The better
explanation may be that feminism represents not women themselves
but the interests of women as defined by feminists. 149 This characterization highlights but does not resolve the basic problem: how does
feminist theory account for divergence between the interests of women
as defined by feminism and the interests of women as expressed by
women themselves?'5 °
Feminism's version of the tension between democracy and fundamental rights resides in the conflict between these substantive and representational commitments. On one hand, feminism's core value of
gender equality reflects a set of principles that are relatively clear, at
least at a high level of generality: freedom from violence and equal
access to education, employment, and political participation, among
others.' 5 ' These commitments can be understood as foundational to a
feminist vision of equal citizenship in much the same way that many
mainstream constitutional theorists deem certain rights foundational to
a well-functioning democracy. On the other hand, when feminists attempt to translate these political objectives into public policy, dissent
arises among women and within feminism. Examples abound: the role
of pornography in promoting sexual violence, 52 the value of single-sex
148 For a discussion of this aspiration and the problems that it raises for feminist identity
politics, see Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Difference and the Problem of Essentialism, in THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE 82, 82-95 (Naomi Schor & Elizabeth Weed eds., i994).
149 I am grateful to Sally Goldfarb for suggesting this distinction.
15O This divergence should not be overstated. Despite the fact that a majority of women in the
United States do not describe themselves as feminists, they do support many of the general commitments of feminism. See, e.g., Floridians Support Radical Feminist Ideas Study, REUTERS,
Mar. 21, r995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuna File (reporting the results of a statewide
survey regarding substantive positions of feminism).
Is' This is not to suggest that feminists agree on any but the most general terms of that equality - that women should enjoy equality however defined.
152 Compare Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 321,
323-24 (1984) C'[Plornography causes attitudes and behaviors of violence and discrimination
....
"), with Carol Smart, Unquestionably a Moral Issue: Rhetorical Devices and Regulatory
Imperatives, in SEX EXPOSED: SEXUALITY AND THE PORNOGRAPHY DEBATE 184, 187 (Lynne
Segal & Mary McIntosh eds., 1992) (critiquing the mode of MacKinnon's argument and indicating
how "much feminist discourse has ignored the way in which fairly traditional moral ideas and
rhetoric have entered feminist speech").
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education,' 3s the treatment of pregnancy under equal employment statutes, 15 4 and the scope of abortion rights 3 S3 have all generated sharp
disagreement both among women and among feminists.

Despite this tension, feminism's representational and substantive
commitments are interdependent in that the authority of feminism to
describe the experience of women collectively on the political level depends upon inclusion and consensus or, at a minimum, an acknowl-

edgment of dissent. 5 6 The problem for feminism, then, is to strike a
balance between the commitment to process and the need to define

coherently the scope of the feminist agenda.
Feminist theorists have responded to the challenge in three basic
ways. The first response has been simply to defend a particular orthodoxy in the face of dissent. Catharine MacKinnon's criticism of femi-

nist opposition to pornography regulation is the best known, but by no
means the only, example of such a response.3

7

Abandoning the repre-

sentational claim, such feminist orthodoxy roots its authority in a theory of what is best for women, not what women may want. Yet, to

the extent that feminism makes claims on behalf of all women, this
position entails a troubling attribution of false consciousness. Moreover, it generates opposition from feminists'3 8 that is particularly politically disabling.
The second and perhaps most common response to dissent has
been an insistence upon the inclusion of marginalized perspectives.1 -9
153 See sources cited supra note 104.

154 Compare Williams, supra note 94, at 352-70, 380 (arguing for treating pregnancy the same
as other temporarily disabling conditions), with Krieger & Cooney, supra note 96, at 516-i8 (arguing for special accomodation), and. Kay, supra note 97, at 32-38 (taking an intermediate
position).
ISS See Linda C. McClain, Equality, Oppression, and Abortion: Women Who Oppose Abortion
Rights in the Name of Feminism, in FEMINIST NIGHTMARES: WOMEN AT ODDS 159, 159-61
(Susan Ostrov Weisser & Jennifer Fleischner eds., 1994).
156 I have argued elsewhere that feminism's representational claim is both a strength and a
vulnerability and must be made carefully and strategically. See Higgins, supra note 8, at
1563-73.
157 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 12, at 198. MacKinnon's position on the problem of
dissent is complex. On one hand, she acknowledges that the attribution of false consciousness to
dissenters is not a satisfactory resolution. See MACKINNON, supra note 5, at 115-16. On the
other hand, she is quick to reject criticism by other feminists of her agenda, especially in the
pornography debate. See MACKINNON, supra note 12, at 199-200, 204-205 (criticizing feminist
lawyers who defend pornography). The assumption that a pro-life position is inconsistent with
feminism is another example of feminist orthodoxy. See McClain, supra note 255, at x59-62; see
also Brief for Respondents at 24-31, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 5o6 U.S. 263
(1993) (No. 90-985) (equating antiabortion protesting with antiwoman animus).
158 See Higgins, supra note 8, at 1569.
159 For examples of such calls for inclusion, consider Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence:
Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 191 (i99o) ("If feminist legal theory is
derived from a feminist method uninformed by critical lesbian experience, the theory will be incomplete."); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 2989 U.
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In the context of political theory, this response is analogous to the
communitarian ideal of local, democratic participation. This response
resolves the problem of dissent only under the assumption that conversation can lead to consensus. Yet such an assumption underestimates
important differences not only in women's experiences and perspectives, but in their political interests as well.' 60 Although feminism has
become more diverse, complex, and multidimensional as a result of the
inclusion of marginalized voices, the hoped-for consensus has not
16 1
emerged.
Most recently, a third approach has emerged that can be seen as a
hybrid of the first two. Influenced by postimodernism, this approach
62
calls for a better process but surrenders any hope for consensus.
Acknowledging that certainty is impossible and dissent therefore inevitable, this response requires, at a minimum, a recognition of the coer63
cion implicit in feminist claims to representation.
Despite their resonance with the central dilemma of constitutional
democracy, none of these feminist responses engages the problem of
political legitimacy at the level of democratic institutions or offers a
political solution to the dilemma of dissent. As in the example of the
VMI referendum, to dismiss the views of the female supporters of
VMI as simply false consciousness is suspect in terms of both democratic and feminist commitments to individual dignity. Relying on the
emergence of consensus - especially consensus regarding a feminist
agenda - is simply unrealistic no matter how complete or inclusive
the process may be.' 64 Moreover, to presume otherwise reflects a profoundly essentialist assumption about the commonality of women's nature and experiences. Recognizing the inevitable tension implicit in
consciousness-raising itself - a tension between women's authority
and false consciousness - is a good theoretical starting point but ofCHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139-40 (observing "how Black women are theoretically erased" and criticizing
"a single-axis framework that is dominant in antidiscrimination law and that is also reflected in

feminist theory and antiracist politics"); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist
Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (iggo) (attempting to introduce the "voices of black
women"); Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S Lj. iiS,
xio (ig8g) ("We must now incorporate into our work the conflicts between the interest and priorities of white women and women of color .... ."); and Minow, cited above in note 140, at 47-48
(warning against "treating particular experiences as universal").
160 See Bartlett, supra note 139, at 883-84 (discussing competing points of view and the effort
to reconcile differences among women and among feminists).
161 For examples of disagreements within feminism, see sources cited in notes 152-155 and
accompanying text.
162 See, e.g., Jane Flax, The End of Innocence, in FEmINsTs THEORIZE THE POLITICAL 445,
455-60 (Judith Butler & Joan W. Scott eds., 1992).

163 See, e.g., id.; Joan C. Williams, Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of the Gaze,
1992 Wis. L. REv. 131, 139 (arguing that, by depriving us of moral certainty, relativism limits the

scope of our moral responsibility).
164 The persistent division among women and among feminists over the issue of coeducation
illustrates the elusiveness of consensus.
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fers little in the way of a response to the women of Virginia who feel
thwarted by feminists in the exercise of their political voice.
B.

Autonomy, Social Construction,and the Limited Self (Why
Consent is Not Enough)

In dealing with the problem of dissent, feminists have refused to
accept women's descriptions of their own experience at face value or
to relinquish the claim to represent women collectively. Despite their
commitment to women's accounts of their experience - to listening to
the voices of the oppressed - feminists have not relied on these accounts to legitimate the feminist political agenda in a straightforward
way. In contrast to liberal theorists' qualified embrace of democracy
and the self-determining subject as citizen, feminist theorists have focused more on the constraints on women's agency and therefore have
been less willing to defer to democracy. Feminists, one might conclude, are distrustful of the People. This section explains this distrust
as rooted in a feminist conception of the self that differs in important
ways from the conception assumed by much of mainstream constitutional theory.
For many feminists, the self that lies at the heart of liberal constitutional theory, both the self that enjoys the individual liberties specified in our own Constitution and the self that participates in
democratic decisionmaking through our majoritarian system, demonstrates a degree of freedom and agency that does not comport with
women's selves under patriarchy.'"s Accordingly, some feminist theorists have begun to examine the implications for democratic theory of
that women's
an alternative conception of the self, one that assumes
166
(and men's) preferences are socially constructed.
Feminists committed to the concept of social construction have
been centrally concerned with the interplay among politics, culture,
and self, and have explored the ways in which culture defines gender
identity. 67 Implicit in this conception is the notion that cultural
165 See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 9, at 549 (describing the atomistic self of liberalism as reflecting a "fundamentally pessimistic perception of human nature and a sadly alienated perception of
self"); cf. Robin West, Feminism, CriticalSocial Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 8S

(concluding that "the liberal self at best reflects male experience of selfhood within the liberal
tradition" and therefore "is not an accurate account of women's experience").
166 Deborah Rhode argues:
['r]o an important extent, women's preferences are socially constructed and constrained.
The state does not simply respond to expressed desires; it plays an active role in legitimating, suppressing, or redirecting them. Attempts to challenge inequality through conventional democratic measures fall short when subordinate groups adapt or accommodate
their preferences to the unequal opportunities available.
Rhode, supra note I4, at ii8g.
167 Feminist theorists sometimes express this relationship between identity and culture as the
distinction between biological sex and culturally defined gender, a distinction perhaps first emphasized by Simone de Beauvoir in her claim: "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. No
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are not merely products of

human will and action but define and limit the possibilities for human
identity. Social construction posits a self that simultaneously determines and is determined by culture (including politics, law, and the
constitutional order). Thus, feminists who employ social construction
theory have been concerned not so much by the way patriarchy limits
women (implying external constraints) but by the way it creates168 or
defines women (implying internal as well as external constraints).
Although this concept of internalized, socially defined constraints
169
on women's identity has long been a part of feminist theorizing,

recent work on social construction theory by feminist legal theorists in

particular bears upon the question of citizenship.

This work has

yielded a concept that I shall call "incomplete agency." 170 This term
expresses the idea that, in a range of legal contexts, women's choices
should be understood as neither fully free nor completely determined. 17 1 Taking into account the ways in which women are con-

strained differently from men has revealed situations in which facially
neutral assumptions about responsibility and choice contribute to
women's inequality. Although theorists have applied this concept most
frequently in the context of women's freedom and coercion in sexual-

ity,'7 2 incomplete agency has broad implications for feminist conceptions of citizenship.

Given the complex conception of the self that underlies much of
feminist theory, there is no reason to expect that feminism's
countermajoritarian dilemma - mediating between political inclusiveness and foundational political commitments - could be resolved by

striking the appropriate balance between fundamental rights and debiological, psychological, or economic fate determines the figure that the human female presents
in society; it is civilization as a whole that produces this creature . . ." SIMONE DE BEAUVOIRm,
THE SECOND SEX 267 (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1949).
168 See Hirschmann, supra note 34, at 52 (suggesting that patriarchal rules constitute "not only
...what women are allowed to do but.., what they are allowed to be as well: how women are
able to think and conceive of themselves, what they can and should desire, what their preferences
are").

169 Even a liberal theorist like Mary Wolistonecraft recognized the significance of social constraints on gender roles. She wrote: "I will venture to affirm, that a girl, whose spirits have not
been damped by inactivity, or innocence tainted by false shame, will always be a romp, and the
doll will never excite attention unless confinement allows her no alternative." MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN 43 (Carol H. Poston ed., W.W. Norton
& Co. 1975) (2d London ed. 1792).
170 The term "incomplete agency" is not meant to imply that complete agency is possible.
Rather, it conveys the idea that women's agency is incomplete relative to men's agency or relative
to the agency assumed by mainstream theory.
171 This concept has also been described as "partial agency." See Abrams, supra note io6, at
346-48 (developing a theory of partial agency).
172 See id. at 350-52; cf. Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 9o MICH. L. REv. I, 34-43 (i99i) (discussing women's agency under conditions of oppression in the context of domestic violence).
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mocracy. On the contrary, even an enhanced catalogue of rights may
be insufficient to address the complexity of women's oppression as
long as those rights are defined as rights against the state. Also, the
possibility of internalized oppression 173 calls into question an understanding of the collectively articulated will of the people as an unproblematic expression of individual freedom. Hence feminism's
distrust of democracy.
C.

Distinguishing Ontology and Advocacy

Thus far, this Article has cited the divergence between mainstream
and feminist conceptions of the self as a way of accounting for both
feminist criticism of our existing constitutional structure and feminists'
relative inattention to questions of democratic legitimacy. Before exploring the implications of incomplete agency for democratic governance, it is important to clarify what does not follow from this type of
empirical or ontological claim.
Liberal theorists' assumptions about the self, which inform much
of mainstream consitutional theory, have been criticized both descriptively and politically. As a descriptive matter, feminists and others
have argued that the assumption that the self is autonomous and
largely self-creating does not accurately describe individuals' - especially women's - experiences. This type of criticism represents either
ontoan empirical claim derived from evidence of actual lives or an
174
logical claim about human nature that may not be verifiable.
In its limited form, this descriptive critique of liberalism's assumption of autonomy may or may not be valid. The critique presupposes
that liberalism endeavors to or is obliged to represent accurately the
nature of the individual. And yet, as Benjamin Barber argues, the
historical priority of the individual can be understood as an "artificial
device," a political tool. 1 75 He explains that "[t]he fiction of the indi-

vidual preceded the reality: in fact, the fiction created the reality, for it
was meant not as a defense of preexisting individuals against encroaching authority, but a justification for the forging of individuals
from socially constructed subjects.' 7 6 In short, liberalism's emphasis
on individualization may constitute a normative claim about the value
of individuation rather than a descriptive claim about the self.
173 The term "internalized oppression" is preferable to "false consciousness" because it simultaneously emphasizes the importance of internal constraints on identity and avoids the suggestion
that "true consciousness" is possible.
174 Robin L. West has made both types of claims. Compare West, supra note 147, at 93-xo8
(focusing on phenomenological differences between the lives of women and men), with West,
supra note 14, at 2-3 (making a more abstract and essential claim about women's and men's
senses of self).
175 Benjamin R. Barber, Liberal Democracy and the Costs of Consent, in LIBERALISM AND
THE MORAL LiFE 54, 6o (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., x989).
176 Id.
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that it inaccurately or inappropriately represents the individual as autonomous - does not respond directly to an argument for a liberal
constitutional structure. Rather, it stands simply as an alternative to
liberalism's assumptions of agency and atomism. The empirical or
ontological status of both claims - liberal autonomy and incomplete
agency - is part of a broader contest within social theory concerning
7 7
Incomhow best to theorize individuals and social organizations.
plete agency is not, on its own, a political critique of liberalism.
Ultimately, the ontological debate over the nature of human beings
may be impossible to resolve; however, it is also only obliquely related

to the debate over the structure of the state. Although some feminists
argue that a communitarian vision better reflects the feminist idea of
self in relationship, 17 8 recognizing that the individual is embedded in
79
culture need not entail advocacy of collectivist social organization.
Even commitment to an ontology that denies the possibility of an atomistic society does not preclude arguments in favor of liberalism.'8 0
Indeed, many feminists advocate reinterpreting liberty precisely to
maximize the autonomy and power of individual women in the face of
constraints.' 8 1
177 See C. FRED ALFORD, THE SELF IN SOCIAL THEORY X-23 (1991) (discussing the debate
over the nature of the self in contemporary social theory).
178 See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 9, 589-9, (associating communitarianism with Carol Gilligan's
description of women's moral reasoning).
179 For arguments in favor of adopting a theory of the public that explicitly incorporates affective bonds and desire, consider Sherry, cited above in note 9, at 58o-gI; and Iris Marion Young,
Impartialityand the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiquesof Moral and Political
Theory, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE: ON THE POLITICS OF GENDER 57, 73-76 (Seyla Benhabib &
Drucilla Cornell eds., 1987).
Chantal Mouffe warns:
[Fleminists should be aware of the limitations of such an approach and of the potential
dangers that a communitarian type of politics presents for the struggle of many oppressed
groups. The communitarian insistence on a substantive notion of the common good and
shared moral values is incompatible with the pluralism that is constitutive of modern
democracy ....
Chantal Mouffe, Feminism, Citizenship, and Radical Democratic Politics, in FEMINISTS THEORIZE THE POLITICAL, supra note 162, at 369, 378; see also Linda C. McClaln, 'Atomistic Man'
Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171, 1173-76
(1992) (defending liberalism in the face of feminist calls for care and connection).
180 Jean Cohen observes:
[A]bstract concepts such as legal personality, fundamental individual rights, privacy, and
decisional autonomy are not equivalent to an ontological description of the self or a particular concept of agency. The principle that individual privacy rights protect decisional autonomy (choice) regarding certain personal or intimate concerns can go quite well with a
recognition of the intersubjective character of processes of personal identity formation ....
Jean L. Cohen, Democracy, Difference, and the Right of Privacy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 187, 197 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1995).
181 For example, feminist critiques of privacy doctrine call for a focus on individual women as
distinct from the family - the unit protected by the right of marital privacy. See WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 4, at II4-2I, 127.
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For feminist political and legal theorists, the proper target is not
the accuracy of liberalism's assumptions about the self but the political
implications of the inaccuracy of those assumptions. To assess these
political implications, feminists must have more than an empirical or
ontological argument about how individuals are constituted. Instead,
feminists must argue that the combination of incomplete agency (as an
empirical or ontological claim) and liberal constitutionalism (as a political scheme) perpetuates women's inequality. Moreover, the choice is
not simply between an atomistic, liberal-legal society and one that values connection and filial bonds. As Charles Taylor argues, even in "a
modern, impersonal society," we make "important choices about how
zealously we entrench in legislation, or enforce through judicial action,
various facets of equality which justice might dictate. What do we
entrust to the spirit of social solidarity and the social mores which
emerge from it? In certain societies the answer may be: very little." 18 2
Thus, the empirical and ontological dispute should not dictate assumptions about legal and constitutional structure but instead should inform an analysis of alternative structures.
IV.

CITIZENSHIP AND THE PROBLEM OF INCOMPLETE AGENCY

This Article began by highlighting the limitations of mainstream
constitutional theory's focus on the tension between democratic will
and fundamental rights. It then argued that, although feminist legal
theory has addressed the limitations of constitutional guarantees of liberty and equality, it has largely ignored questions of democratic legitimacy and citizenship. Part Ill suggested that, notwithstanding their
inattention to the countermajoritarian difficulty of mainstream constitutionalism, feminists have struggled with issues of authority and dissent in other contexts. Out of this struggle a concept of incomplete
agency has emerged. This Part explores the implications of incomplete
agency for constitutional theory and particularly for citizenship and
democratic process. It first considers the degree to which an assumption of incomplete agency undermines consent-based justifications for
democracy and what the rudiments of an alternative conception of
freedom might be. After sketching such an alternative conception, this
Part examines its implications for democracy and constitutionalism,
and suggests a framework for a specifically feminist conception of the
role of the state.

182 Charles Taylor, Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in LIBERALISM AND
THE MoRAL LIFE, supra note 175, at 159, 161-62; see also Sherry, supra note 9, at 569 (discussing
Roberto Unger's efforts to bridge "the liberal dichotomy between individual and society).
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From Social Contract to Social Construction

Mainstream constitutional theory rests heavily on consent theory.
Government is legitimate because it is democratic, and democracy is
legitimate because it is consensual.' 8 3 Critics, including many feminists, have challenged the conception of consent underlying this traditional view by asking: How can a citizen meaningfully consent if her
nature and beliefs are themselves a product of he system to which she
consents? 84 Although this critical view precludes simple reliance on
existing preferences as a source of state power, it does not reject the
value of political participation. Rather, it simply means that consent
cannot serve as the source of the state's legitimacy nor define the
boundaries of state power.
Although social construction calls into question the foundational
role of consent in democratic theory, it does not undermine self-determination altogether as an aspect of freedom. Indeed, despite feminist
theory's emphasis on the ways in which women (and men) are determined by patriarchy, feminists are far from willing to relinquish the
possibility of freedom. 8 5 Instead, feminists have been centrally concerned with freeing women to define their own lives rather than accept the definition imposed on them by others.' 8 6 Thus, the debate
over agency suggests not the impossibility of freedom but rather the
need to develop a feminist conception of freedom. To develop such a
conception, feminists must distinguish between the descriptive claim
that individuals are embedded within and shaped by culture, on one
hand, and the possibility of creating agency as an aspect of citizenship,
on the other.
In contrast to our constitutional scheme, such a model would not
simply take individual agency for granted or assume that it exists prepolitically. 8 7 Although state limitations on individual freedom would
183See Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY
AND DIFFERENCE, supra note i8o, at 95, 9S (defining democractic legitimacy as "the authorization
to exercise state power [through] the collective decisions of the members of a society who are
governed by that power").
184 See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 3-6 (1984) (discussing the conflicts
inherent in liberal democracy, especially regarding consent theory); PATEMAN, supra note 32, at 71
(criticizing liberal theory as "gloss[ing] over the ambiguity, inherent in consent theory from its
beginnings, about which individuals or groups are capable of consenting and so count as full
members of the political order").
18S5Nancy Hirschmann argues that "the notion that the context for women's desires and preferences is, for the most part, a patriarchal one does not mean that women are simply 'unfree.'"
Hirschmann, supra note 34, at 48. Recognizing that social construction is inescapable for men
and for women, she argues for a conception of freedom that reflects relative power. See id. at 57.
186 See, e.g., id. at 63-64; see also West, supra note 14, at 61-70 (suggesting that such a defini-

tion might have a profound and transformative effect on law and jurisprudence).
187 Although these assumptions characterize our constitutional scheme, they are not necessary
to liberal constitutionalism. Indeed, certain conceptions of liberalism have given fuller attention to
the preconditions for meaningful freedom than I suggest here. For example, John Dewey suggests:
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continue to be relevant to the assessment of agency, they would comprise only one of several different types of constraints. As feminists
have long suggested in their critique of the public/private dichotomy,
both private exercise of power and state action threaten equal citizenship. 8 8 But beyond these external constraints, both public and private, a theory of freedom that takes social construction seriously
would also address internal constraints.8 9 Such internal barriers,
whether deemed false consciousness or internalized oppression, limit
individuals' ability to function as citizens in the way that traditional
democratic theory presumes they must: by exercising their democratic
function in pursuit of their own interests and their own conception of
the general good. Simply stated, the assumption of incomplete agency
raises the possibility that individuals may not be the best judges of
their own interests or those of the community.
The problems that incomplete agency presents for liberal constitutionalism become apparent when cultural constraints operate in a way
that systematically disempowers certain groups relative to others.
Under such circumstances, the critical problem with overstating the
agency of the individual is not that human nature is misdescribed but
that the political consequences of that misdescription are visited unequally on different groups. Thus, for feminists, the assumption that
the self is adequately protected by negative liberties so as to enable
her full participation in both public and private life is problematic not
because it is inaccurate but because it implies a level of agency that,
under patriarchy, may be more accurate for men than for women. 190
This analysis does not imply that existing freedoms are meaningless
for women. Rather, such freedoms simply do not endow women with
equal capacity as citizens. 191
Liberalism knows that social conditions may restrict, distort, and almost prevent the development of individuality. It therefore takes an active interest in the working of social institutions that have a bearing, positive or negative, upon the growth of individuals who shall
be rugged in fact and not merely in abstract theory. It is as much interested in the positive construction of favorable institutions, legal, political, and economic, as it is in the
work of removing abuses and overt oppressions.
John Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, in DEWEY AND His CRiTIcs: EssAYs FROM THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 695, 697 (Sidney Morgenbesser ed., 1977). However, Dewey's description of
liberalism differs-from the one that is reflected in American constitutional democracy.
188 See supra Part II.A.i (discussing the public/private distinction).
189 Cf Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of ransition-Perspectives
on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 23, 24-27 (taking account of the significance and limits of women's perspectives); West, supra note x4, at 37-42 (discussing men's and
women's different experiences of oppression).
190 As Carol Weisbrod explains, "[o]nly if the consequences of subordination or suppression are
viewed as essentially moderate - as a remediable injustice rather than a total annihilation of the
autonomous self - can one go in the direction of immediate public participation by women
within liberalism .... " Carol Weisbrod, PracticalPolyphony: Theories of the State and Feminist
Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REv. 985, 99o (iggo) (footnote omitted).
191 Cf. Hirschrnann, supra note 34, at 57 (emphasizing the importance of relative power in
understanding social construction).
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Social construction theory argues, therefore, for the inclusion of internal constraints in a feminist conception of freedom. Yet, classifying
those constraints as akin to distinct exercises of private or public
power is misleading in that it suggests that social construction can be
limited or escaped altogether in a well-functioning political system.
Moreover, to the extent that internal barriers are understood simply as
psychological constraints and are associated particularly with women's
condition, this model risks pathologizing those constraints. 192 For
these reasons, internal constraints might best be described as diffuse
cultural constraints, structural and widespread rather than individualized and specific. Understood as such, they are no less relevant to an
understanding of individual agency, although they do present a more
difficult problem in linking freedom to questions of political structure.
If social construction is inescapable, then freedom cannot be characterized as the condition existing after constraints are eliminated.
Rather, freedom is better understood as a manifestation of power relations than as a condition measured with respect to the exercise of state
power. In this sense, power dictates freedom not because the powerful
escape social construction but because in our society power is socially
constructed as freedom. Power and freedom are linked in individual
193
experience in a way that defines individual agency.
Whereas for the liberal, freedom is a pre-existing condition that is
largely antecedent to democracy, for the feminist, freedom is a created
condition, produced rather than merely preserved by democracy. Freedom must be defined and defended as a set of social conditions, not as
the absence of political or social constraints.
B.

Incomplete Agency and Constitutional Theory: the Role of
Democratic Participation

According to much of mainstream democratic theory, the legitimacy of the democratic process itself depends upon limiting the reach
of that process, ensuring a sphere of freedom in which the individual
can make and act on political and personal choices.' 9 4 Conversely,
once the constitutional structure ensures that sphere of liberty, the expression of individual choices through the democratic process lends legitimacy to state action constraining freedom. The assumption of
incomplete agency presses the limits of this formulation by suggesting
192 For a discussion of this problem in connection with Battered Women's Syndrome, consult
Littleton, supra note x89, at 33-47.
193 This relationship between power and freedom is defined not only by gender but also by
race, class, education, and other factors. Thus, as Hirschmann notes, "some women are better
placed to support patriarchy - and accordingly freer - than are some men by virtue of race,
class, or other privileging factors . . . ." Hirschmann, supra note 34, at 57.
194 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 142 (arguing that "[c]onstitutionalism can thus guarantee the preconditions for democracy by limiting the power of majorities to eliminate those
preconditions").
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that freedom cannot be equated with simple autonomy. 195 If, as the
preceding section suggests, our social context is constitutive of us and
determines our choices (at least in part), constraints on the state alone
cannot ensure freedom, nor can the exercise of individual will un96
problematically legitimate the power of the state.'
So stated, the assumption of incomplete agency that follows from a
conception of the self as socially constructed reinforces feminist critiques of the public/private distinction. If freedom does not preexist
politics, little justification exists for distinguishing public power from
private power as a potential threat to that freedom. 97 Thus, the assumption of incomplete agency supports feminist arguments that the
guarantee of citizens' liberty must extend beyond state action.' 98 For
example, protecting women from domestic violence is as essential to
securing their freedom as protecting their right to political participation.' 9 9 Similarly, equality cannot be equated with state neutrality but
must be evaluated against substantive conditions produced by both
20 0
public and private power.
An assumption of incomplete agency also reinforces dominance
analysis. By positing that the citizen lacks full agency, a conception of
the self as socially constructed justifies the exercise of judicial review
of gender-based legislative categories notwithstanding women's potential political power. Effecting equality through judicial review rather
than through the democratic exercise of that power poses no important
threat to a majoritarian process that is already suspect in feminist
terms.2 0 ' More generally, under a theory of incomplete agency, constitutional rights secured against majoritarian will need not be justified
195 For a discussion of the implications of this assumption for feminist methodology, consider
Higgins, supra note 138, at i2i.
196 See PATEMAN, supra note 63, at 83 (noting that "[cjonsent is central to liberal democracy,

because it is essential to maintain individual freedom and equality; but it is a problem for liberal
democracy, because individual freedom and equality is also a precondition for the practice of
consent").
197 Cf. Biddy Martin, Feminism, Criticism, and Foucault, in FEMINISMs & FOUCAULT: REFLECTIONS ON RESISTANCE 3, 6 (Irene Diamond & Lee Quinby eds., 1988) (eschewing a view of

"power as originating outside of and independent of concrete social interactions and their material
effects"); Jana Sawicki, Identity Politics and Sexual Freedom: Foucault and Feminism, in FEmINISm & FOUCAULT, supra, at 177, x86-87 (advocating a Foucauldian analysis of power, which
emphasizes the importance of multiple sites of oppression).
198 For a discussion of feminist substantive critiques of the public/private distinction and liberty, narrowly defined, consult Part ll.A.i above.
199 Robin West argues that the fear of sexual violence "badly cripples women's sense of ourselves and societal perceptions of us as autonomous, free, and independent agents ....
[The repeatedly abused woman] quite literally lacks the capacity to be herself when she has been put
under the sovereign will of a violent and violence-prone partner." WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTI.
TUTIONALISM, supra note 4, at 116.
200 See supra p. x676-78 (discussing feminists' critiques of the concept of equal protection as
antidiscrimination rather than antisubordination).
201 See MacKinnon, supra note xo, at 1774 (noting that the "so-called 'majoritarian premise'
.. . began by assuming about fifty-three percent of the population out").
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by reference to the democratic process because democracy loses its legitimating power.
Despite its apparent compatibility with central feminist constitutional critiques, an assumption of incomplete agency also raises conceptual problems for these critiques. Just as the socially constructed
self as citizen calls into question the legitimating power of the democratic process, this conception of self also undercuts the authority of
any particular vision of gender equality, including feminist visions that
inform dominance analysis. These applications of dominance analysis
may be contested20 2 and, according to social construction theory, must
20 3
be treated as partial and contingent.
Positing social construction suggests an important role for a deliberative democratic process in the transformative project of feminism.
The furtherance of gender equality requires that disputed gender
norms be measured against a standard that gives content to the notion
of equality. As feminists have observed, that standard must be forged
through public discourse concerning gender identity and the conditions
of subordination. 20 4 Although courts have a role to play in this process, the transformative potential of more open, participatory, and
egalitarian democratic institutions may be considerably greater. 20 5
Moreover, when it takes place in such a setting, this deliberative process can simultaneously generate legal standards
and transform the
20 6
self-understanding of individual citizens.

202 See supra p. 1678 (discussing the difficulty of applying dominance analysis and the probable disagreement among feminists as to whether single-gender public schools are conducive to
equality).
203 As Katharine Bartlett explains, "[t]ruth is partial in that the individual perspectives that
yield and judge truth are necessarily incomplete. No individual can understand except from some
limited perspective." Bartlett, supra note 139, at 888.
204 Jfirgen Habermas describes this politics-as-consciousness-raising effect and the connection
between private and public autonomy. See Jtlrgen Habermas, Paradigms ofLaw, 17 CARDozo L.
REV. 771, 784 (William Rehg trans., x996). Linking discourse and rights, he explains:
Rights can empower both men and women to shape their own lives autonomously only to
the extent that these rights also facilitate equal participation in the practice of civic selfdetermination, because only the affected persons themselves can clarify the "relevant aspects" - the standards and criteria - that define equality and inequality for a given
matter.
Id. at 780.
205 For discussion of the functioning of such processes and their transformative potential, consider Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY
AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 180, at 67, 67-80, and Iris Marion Young, Communication and the
Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note 18o, at
120, 120-33.

206 Charles Taylor has called this idea "an exercise-concept" of liberty, that individuals must
exercise their capacities if they are to be free. Charles Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ISAIAH BERLIN 175, 177 (Alan Ryan ed.,
1979).
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Democracy and Institutional Roles: A Final Look at VMI

Implicit in the assumption of incomplete agency is the idea that
politics is recursive: political choices define preferences just as preferences define political choices. This notion of recursive politics suggests
a response to John Hart Ely's confusion concerning women's political
power. Ely's "intuition" - "that women have been operating at an
unfair disadvantage in the political process" - is only "tricky [to]
pin[ ] down" if one assumes that preferences are exogenous to politics. 20 7 Beginning with that assumption and ignoring diffuse, socially
defined constraints, one may conclude, as Justice Scalia does in VMI,
that the legislative process adequately protects women - that, apart
from stare decisis, gender ought not be deemed a suspect classification. 208 This section explores how a model of recursive politics would
alter the balance between judicial enforcement of equal protection and
deference to majoritarian uses of gender categories.
A theory of recursive politics, together with a conception of freedom as a product of public and private power, undermines the assumption that the state best serves freedom by respecting private
preferences. Instead, such a theory would permit or even require the
state to assume a role in shaping such preferences or norms through a
model of public discourse.2 0 9 The critical question, then, is: How and
under what circumstances should the state exercise this power to
shape norms? This question has no easy answer. Much of feminist
constitutional analysis and litigation has aimed to defeat state-sponsored conceptions of gender roles. 210 Indeed, Virginia's attempt to
shape norms by training men as citizen-soldiers was at the heart of
many feminists' objections to VII. Presented with state-sponsored ex-

207 ELY, supra note i,at 164.
208 See United States v. Virginia,

116 S. Ct. 2264, 2295-96 (x996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[l]t is
perfectly clear that, if the question of the applicable standard of review for sex-based classifications were to be regarded as an appropriate subject for reconsideration, the stronger argument
would be .. .for reducing it to rational-basis review.").
209 This notion that the state necessarily plays a role in shaping private preferences has begun
to work its way into mainstream legal theory, as well as into feminism. See, e.g., Lawrence
Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 943, ioI6-1g, 1034-36 (x995) (arguing that government's inherent role in shaping social meaning must be limited but not barred by
First Amendment doctrine); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.

903, 907 (1996).

This motivation informed the earliest cases, see Bradwell v. Iflinois, 83 U.S. (x6 Wall.) 130,
("[Bradwell's attorney] proceeds to argue that admission to the bar of a State of a
person who possesses the requisite learning and character is one of those [privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States] which a State may not deny."), to the most recent, see VMI,
116 S. Ct. at 2269 C'agree[ingT" that the state may not "reserv[e] exclusively to men the unique
educational opportunities VM[ affords"); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (x994)
("[Glender ...is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality.").
210

138 (1872)
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clusion on one hand and state
neutrality on the other, neutrality has
211
seemed the obvious choice.
Mainstream constitutional theory seems to provide an easy answer.
It defines the choice as binary: deference to politically expressed preferences versus state neutrality. This all-or-nothing approach permits a
convenient agnosticism regarding more robust conceptions of gender
equality. Operating within this liberal framework, both Justice Scalia
and Justice Ginsburg expressed this agnosticism, albeit in different
ways. Justice Scalia chose to defer to political choice, making respect
for private preferences an axiom of political freedom. Absent either
process failure or historical precedent, he argued, the Court should re212
frain from interfering with the effectuation of those preferences.
Justice Ginsburg and a majority of the Court chose the other alternative - neutrality. In so doing, they avoided any clear distinction between positive uses of gender classifications and negatives ones. 2 13 As
a result, they limited the power of the state to shape prevailing norms
in a gender-specific way.2 14

The majority's approach, like Justice

Scalia's, risks entrenching existing biases, not by granting them undue
deference in the political process but by granting them greater power
in the private sphere.
The agnosticism of the mainstream approach, however, is illusory.
In fact, both uncritical deference to political will and simple insistence
on state neutrality favor the status quo. Deference does so by discounting the extent to which existing inequality shapes democratic
choices. Strict neutrality does so by denying the state an important
role in re-shaping private biases, which derive from and perpetuate
that inequality.
In contrast, a theory of recursive politics would, at the outset,
render unavoidable a judgment about the specific use of gender in
government decisionmaking and the relationship of this use to gender
equality. In reviewing the use- of gender-based classifications, the
Supreme Court could not simply defer to the unexamined choice of the
People, nor could it apply a general requirement of state neutrality.
Instead, a recursive politics approach would oblige the Court to develop and defend a standard of gender justice against which to mea211 Justice Ginsburg's own legal career has reflected a strong commitment to this choice. See
supra p. 1673 (discussing Ginsburg's litigation strategy at the American Civil Liberties Union).

212 See VMI, ir6 S. Ct. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213 Although Justice Ginsburg's opinion acknowledged the possibility of benign uses of genderbased classifications, see VMI, i6 S. Ct. at 2276, the Court did not elaborate on this possibility.
214 By failing to articulate a clear theory of the illegitimacy of the VM policy, the Court called
into question the use of gender classifications for liberatory purposes. Given the Court's recent
approach to race-based classifications, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. CL 2097,
2113 (r995) (applying strict scrutiny to benign racial classifications in congressionally-created affirmative action programs), the Court will likely restrict gender-based classifications to cases involving biological difference.
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sure gender-based classifications. Unlike the dominance model,
however, such a standard would entail both a substantive conception
of equality and a procedural conception of democratic functioning. In
assessing political uses of gender, the Court could apply dominance
analysis to invalidate legislative classifications the meaning and effects
of which are clearly subordinating. In situations in which the meaning
and effects are in doubt, the Court could more closely examine the
functioning of the political process that generated the gender-based
policy. The scope of the political process relevant to this inquiry may
include not simply formal democratic deliberative bodies such as legislatures but also the public sphere of debate, deliberation, and contestation among individuals and groups within the polity.2 15 Unlike Ely's
process-based interpretation of equal protection, this model would require actual consideration of the political process rather than specula216
tion about the disadvantage of groups within that process.

In the example of VMI, the Court might have invalidated the
male-only admissions policy through a substantive application of dominance analysis: the classification reinforced the subordination of the
less powerful group - in this case, women. 2 17 In VMI, therefore, the
Court would not have needed to consider the process question at all.
No process would justify a clearly subordinating classification. In contrast, New York City's creation of an all-female high school for math
and science presents a more difficult case. Although the validity of
single-sex education may be disputed under a dominance model, the
policy does respond to an identified social inequality and attempts to
address that inequality by favoring the less powerful group, adolescent
girls. However, because of the scarce resources of the school system
215 For one model of such a process, consider Iris Marion Young, Communication and the
Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE, supra note x8o, at

120-33.
216 The Court's consideration of Colorado's Amendment 2 in Romer v. Evans, xx6 S. Ct. 1620
(1996), might serve as a model for this type of review. See id. at 1624-27 (considering the effect
of Amendment 2 on the ability of gays and lesbians to participate effectively in the democratic
process at all levels).
217 Of course, this mode of analysis is not unfamiliar to equal protection doctrine. It represents
a somewhat more expansive version of the Court's deference to benign racial classifications limited in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), and Adarand. Compare Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (iggo) ("We hold that benign race-conscious
measures mandated by Congress ... are constitutionally permissible to the extent that they serve
important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives." (footnote omitted)), and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
490-91 (298o) (plurality opinion) VCongress... perceived a pressing need to move forward with
new approaches ... to achieve the goal of equality of economic opportunity... . Congress has
necessary latitude to try new techniques such as the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria to
accomplish remedial objectives ... ."), with Croson, 488 U.S. at 483-95 (rejecting the deferential
standard of Fullilove), and Adarand, 2i5 S. Ct. at 2117 ("[Fjederal racial classifications, like those
of a State, must serve a compelling governmental interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest").
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and the composition of its student population, the city's choice to create the girls' school is not an unambiguous shift from a more powerful
to a less powerful group. 218 Nevertheless, the impulse behind the effort is consistent with the aspiration of equal citizenship underlying
the Equal Protection Clause. In this way, the Court could rather easily distinguish this case from VMI.
This theory of recursive politics need not imply an expanded role
for the Court at the expense of popular sovereignty. As the example
of the New York City school suggests, the reshaping of private preferences and social norms is a function uniquely suited to the political
branches. Through participation in the legislative process itself, individuals' aspirations for liberty and equality can be questioned, tested,
and redefined. Although the Court might at times initiate this process
of reconsideration and would necessarily constrain the scope of the
process, the transformation should take place at the level of politics.
CONCLUSION

Reconceived in this way, equal protection analysis anticipates a
role for the Court in promoting equality through judicial review. At
the same time, this analysis recognizes the importance of political efforts to transform social norms that have defined women as unequal to
men. This understanding of equal protection more closely reflects feminism's simultaneous commitment to respecting and perfecting
women's experience than liberalism's simultaneous commitment to being ruled by law and by men. From the standpoint of feminist constitutional theory, therefore, this version of the countermajoritarian
difficulty captures a true dilemma rather than a false choice.
218 The dropout rates for girls and boys in East Harlem (the district served by the school) are
seventeen and nineteen percent, respectively. OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH, THE CLASS
OF 1995 FOUR-YEAR LONGITUDINAL REPORT ro (x995). Moreover, although research indicates
that, unlike for girls, the benefit for boys of single-sex education is very limited, several studies
have shown that single-sex schools can improve the educational achievement of Black and Latino

boys. See

CORNELIUS RIORDAN, GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOL: TOGETHER OR SEPARATE? 110-13

(iggo); Cornelius Riordan, Single-Sex Gender Schools: Outcomesfor African and Hispanic Americans, Io RESEARCH IN SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION AND SOCIALIZATION 117, I98 (1994).

